I would love the groundballers strategy if I had more confidence in Bogaerts. But unless he takes enormous steps forward, you're greatly curtailing the advantage by having at best an average defender at the most important position, even if they are good to great everywhere else. He had better hit.
The groundball strategy and Bogaerts' fielding
- Thread starter Toe Nash
- Start date
Indeed. Sink or swim for Bogaerts defensively for sure ... if he doesn't improve, he'll set the A.L. record for errors by a SS. (which, for the record, is 98 - by John Gochnauer in 1903)twibnotes said:
Vermonter At Large said:
How quickly we forget the Renteria era.
Also, don't forget we have Marrero (if we truly need to pick up a late inning defensive SS).
Toe Nash said:
He's gonna hit. But also consider the fact that a ground ball is worth about .05 runs and a fly ball about .12, and that's over the major league average. In Fenway Park, fly balls have to be worth a little bit more. Having an average defensive shortstop instead of a tremendous one isn't going to double the worth of a ground ball, which is what would have to happen for it to be even close to worth as much as a fly ball.
Rovin Romine said:
Just for a few yuks, imagine for a moment, a 2016 team with a bench of Craig, Holt, Marrero, and Vazquez. Of course, this means Craig has shown a little something, but I think that would be a very deep, very flexible team, and one with a decent chance of repeating as World Series Champions.
Vermonter At Large said:
I don't think that Bogaerts will ever compile big error numbers. His glove looks pretty reliable for those balls that he reaches, and his arm may be the best part of his defensive game. It's the grounders he doesn't reach because he is slow afoot, the liners he can't snare because he can't jump, and the double plays that he fails to convert because of his clumsy footwork. Bogaerts' deficiencies will go straight to BABIP's bottom line.
To my eye, almost all of Bogaert's problems last year, especially during his first stint at SS, seemed related to timing. He didn't yet have a feel for how fast major leaguers can get down the line. Mostly that meant that he rushed when he didn't have to (which led to poor footwork, bad grips, overthrowing), and then he would overcompensate, try not to rush, and just not get it to first in time.Sprowl said:
kieckeredinthehead said:
Then, just as he seemed to be getting a grasp on the speed and timing, they signed Drew and announced X would be moving to 3B. The timing of that switch robbed him of half a season's worth of reps at SS and set him back a bit developmentally.
Yep also has me worried, Xander's double play turn was dicey. We can use all the 'development/move to 3rd' excuses we like, but it looked like years worth of ingrained bad habits.Rasputin said:
If we see the "tap the bag, shuffle/slide the feet towards the OF, with a side arm flip" in spring training then it will trickle down to BABIP (or maybe not since hitting into a DP or a force out still counts as 0-1)
I'm hoping Pedey was all over Xander at API (or whatever its called now) this winter, and pulled a 'Clockwork Orange' with X and had him watch hours of Stephen Drew, Orlando Cabrerra, etc turn the double play.
Even after he returned to SS, he played a few outs into hits by not putting enough zip on his throws. It's not uncommon for an extremely talented kid to have played in the field at 85% effort level, and for that to be enough. I agree with your thought; the speed of the ML game caught him by surprise and habits he developed when younger must be corrected.. The good thing is, that's an easily correctable condition.kieckeredinthehead said:
Sprowl said:
Also, FWIW, I suggested Marrero could be a late inning defensive replacement. However, I realized we may not be using late inning GB pitchers, assuming Taz and Ue are filling the 8-9th in tight games.
So unless we do some sort of whacky reversal (defensive SS starts - with attendant drain on line up?, and X comes in later), we're stuck with Bogaerts as the primary SS for our GB rotation.
Which isn't to say Bogaerts shouldn't be spelled or relieved or given the odd day off.
I wasn't impressed with Bogaerts at shortstop the handful of times I saw him playing for Portland. I thought his reaction time was slow in getting his first step. He supposedly is working on that this winter so I don't think we can tell anything until we see him play again.
Given that he's still young enough to learn the nuances of the position, it isn't impossible to project that Bogaerts will improve given practice, reps and the right instruction. Brian Butterfield is among the very best infield teachers in the game, so he's sure to get the proper guidance. Pedroia will also certainly be a source of help in this regard. I don't disagree that I've seen some concerning habits from X, but I also believe that he'll grow as both a fielder and a hitter in 2015, and that the best is yet to come with him.charlieoscar said:
I don't think there is a strict "groundball strategy." What I mean is that I don't think the entire focus is on inducing ground balls. Rather, I think they are looking to exploit the expanding strike zone while it is being called lower and that's led to acquiring guys who work down in the zone and thus, guys who tend to generate more balls in play that happen to be on the ground. They should also see an improvement in strikes called low in the zone which can have a cascading effect on at bats, innings and games. Forcing hitters to swing at pitches lower than they'd normally chase can help pitchers to get ahead, can better set up the high fastball to strike batters out or get them under the pitch leading to pop ups, and might even force hitters to move up in the box a little to try and get to the ball before it gets too low in the zone, increasing the effective velocity of the guy throwing the pitch.
Yes, this staff will induce a lot of ground balls, but I think that is one of several desired outcomes, not the foundation of their new strategy. So I don't think there is necessarily any real conflict between having a lot of ground ball pitchers on the staff and keeping Bogaerts at short. He's not the optimal defender at that position for this staff, but I don't think they need to go all in and slot in the best possible defender at the expense of all other skills. If Bogaerts hits well this year, his defense should be good enough for him to be extremely valuable overall. If he's putting up a .600 OPS there are larger problems to concern ourselves with.
Yes, this staff will induce a lot of ground balls, but I think that is one of several desired outcomes, not the foundation of their new strategy. So I don't think there is necessarily any real conflict between having a lot of ground ball pitchers on the staff and keeping Bogaerts at short. He's not the optimal defender at that position for this staff, but I don't think they need to go all in and slot in the best possible defender at the expense of all other skills. If Bogaerts hits well this year, his defense should be good enough for him to be extremely valuable overall. If he's putting up a .600 OPS there are larger problems to concern ourselves with.
I'm thinking the Sox prefer to have Marrero play everyday in Pawtucket - at least to start the season. Holt can play SS if needed as a backup - he played some games there last season and seemed competent.
I like the fact that he made such a strong commitment to work on improving his first step quickness during the off season. Returning to Arizona to spend time with Pedroia before ST is also impressive. It's clear he wants to be a SS and is doing those things necessary to achieve that goal. Easy to root for a kid like this.
gryoung said:
I don't think there is room for Marrero on the bench. 5 starters, 7 relievers, 9 batters in the lineup leaves room for 4 on the bench...backup catcher, utility infielder, outfielder who can play center and probably an OF/1B/DH type. And probably one of the bench needs to be able to pinch run well.
As I noted in the other thread, this is my reading as well. To the extent that this is a coherent strategy rather than just the best trades/free agents available for what they are willing to give up, then it is likely to be that a market inefficiency exists in which groundball pitchers cost less than strikeout pitchers with the same xFIP in terms of salary or prospects. They would be pursuing this strategy regardless of their catcher and shortstop combo.Rudy Pemberton said:
If he hits well, a team can be pretty successful with that level of defense at SS.
Calm eyes help too.
They probably could have landed Latos and/or Eovaldi for similar prospects as they splashed out for Miley, Porcello, and Ross if they desired a classic hard throwing/strikeout pitcher.Rudy Pemberton said:
There's a gift basket by the door.EvilEmpire said:
My view has always been that the X-man is going to be a great player. But I think he's a terrible shortstop, and I don't expect to see him improve that much.
I've wondered recently if my perception is slanted by watching Iglesias and Drew--both of them masters of the position. But Bogaerts just appears slow to the ball--terrible range--and it makes you wonder why the scouts/coaching staff left him there at short.
Hopefully this season will help prove that I am not that good at talent evaluation.
EvilEmpire said:
In theory, one would say yes in the long run but in real life it depends on the timing, I guess we could say leverage index. If a player's contributions on offense take place mostly in low leverage situations while his fielding problems occur mostly in high leverage ones, his impact will be less than if it happened the other way around.
A couple of days ago, a column in the Boston Herald cited Baseball Prospectus as predicting the Red Sox to score 802 runs and allow 748 in the 2015 season, with an expected record of 86-76. A simple application of Bill James's Pythagorean formula (with an exponent of 1.83) predicts 86.16 wins and 75.84 losses from those run totals. If you increase the RS and RA by 10 runs apiece, you find that the predicted wins drops to 86.09. In other words, there is slightly more downside to allowing more runs for teams with winning percentages over .500.
EvilEmpire said:
This is something I've always wondered about: Jeter was a bad defensive player, but it didn't really seem to hurt the Yankees much during his career. They had some pitchers who got a lot of strikeouts, but they also had a starter who didn't strike out many batters, and he had some very good years as a Yankee. They had some good defenders playing beside Jeter at third and second, but they also had some notorious butchers there, too. Same thing with Manny Ramirez, who by the numbers was awful, but whose teams were consistently great. Again, he had some great CFs playing next to him - Lofton, Damon, Coco - but he also had Matt Kemp, never a good defender, next to him in LA and that didn't seem to matter much.
I guess my point is just that it's easy to overrate the impact of one bad defender on a team.
I think various defensive metrics can be awesome at differentiating the fielding ability of players relative to each other, particularly at a given position, but are something less than awesome at accurately measuring the impact of individual fielding ability on team performance.
Of course I realize this is probably due my own ignorance.
Could the ground ball philosophy coincide with a better understanding of defensive placement? I know with that new tracking system they debuted late last year, defensive analysis is goong to be infinitely better.
It won't help his pivot, but being able to put everyone in the right place could help mask any deficiencies in range.
It won't help his pivot, but being able to put everyone in the right place could help mask any deficiencies in range.
When talking about Bogaerts, you've got to read this long piece about Red Sox scouting:
We shouldn't forget that Xander came from a resource-poor baseball background. Aruba wasn't the type of place (compared to, say, the Dominican Republic) where a kid grows up playing shortstop and developing muscle memory throughout his youth.
Please read that article if you haven't already.
We shouldn't forget that Xander came from a resource-poor baseball background. Aruba wasn't the type of place (compared to, say, the Dominican Republic) where a kid grows up playing shortstop and developing muscle memory throughout his youth.
Please read that article if you haven't already.
Yeah .. That's a great article .. I believe it was posted hereabouts last April when it was originally published. Enjoyed re-reading it.geoduck no quahog said:
Rasputin said:
For infield positioning, it seems like park effects would probably matter less, although I'm sure there's some variation from infield to infield. Plus I guess the run expectancy of a ball getting through a certain area might differ slightly from park to park (like some of those screamers down the 1B line in Fenway that are occasionally misplayed into triples). Ok, so maybe it's important
I haven't been on the board for a while, so maybe this has been discussed ad nauseum (and if so I humbly apologize), but the reason for this whole groundball focus seems like it could be extremely simple to me. I'm not sure it's so much about infield fielding prowess as it is about avoiding flyballs to left center field (LCF). If you look at the table in this article, flyballs hit to LCF at Fenway turn into doubles at just an insane rate. Flyballs hit to that area account for a huge portion of Fenway's hitter-friendly effects. I would speculate that the benefits of avoiding flyballs to that area could be even larger than the difference between a good v. mediocre fielding SS. So it's possible Bogaerts could be the Manny Ramirez of SS, and a groundball strategy might still be effective. I haven't done that math on that, but it doesn't seem insanely far-fetched to me. The damage caused by flyballs to LCF seems so significant that the tradeoff for a few extra groundballs getting through the SS side might be worth it.
If Bogaerts has trouble with the double-play, then that might negate a lot of those effects, though. Double plays just change run expectancy so much.
EDIT: I guess Manny was probably worse than mediocre, but it's possible Bogaerts could be merely below average and still be acceptable at SS at Fenway. Outside of Fenway, the strategy might get a little uglier.
Snodgrass'Muff said:
MLB could alter strike zone as response to declining offense
Yahoo! Sports | Feb 13
Major League Baseball is considering altering the textbook definition of the strike zone for the first time in nearly two decades, fearful that the proliferation of the low strike has sapped too much offense from the game, league sources told Yahoo Sports.
http://www.prosportsdaily.com/articles/mlb-could-alter-strike-zone-as-response-to-declining-offense-341614.html
If any changes are made, it won't be for the 2015 season. Most of these acquisitions are short term and the one's that aren't (Miley and Porcello if they extend him) have value beyond capitalizing on a lower zone. Even if the zone is brought up a bit, a catcher like Vazquez is still going to get the more pitches low in or just out the zone called strikes, so the opportunity to take advantage of guys who keep the ball down isn't nullified or anything.
Snodgrass'Muff said:
True - but where this really sucks is for teams that sell low on poorly performing players/prospects who may bounce back if the strike zone is redrawn.
I wonder if WMB is such a player: http://sonsofsamhorn.net/topic/84874-will-middlebrooks-now-or-never/?p=5628819
The caveat here is that a strike zone expansion or contraction might have a kind of synergistic effect on a hitter's fortunes, beyond just a simple inability to connect low in the zone.
The thing I wonder is, if statistically significant, why has the called strike zone increased over the last 6 years? Are pitchers using more late breaking pitches like sinkers? Some sort of unintended consequence of better pitch tracking?
The consensus (which doesn't mean it's right) is that it's a consequence of the pitch tracking systems. PitchFX was put into stadiums by 2008, and it's used internally to grade umpires. The zone expansion really started around 2010, which fits with this suggestion pretty well:theapportioner said:
The "standard" strike zone, that was called in 2008/2009, doesn't match the official zone; the 2014 zone is closer to the rulebook zone. As far as I know umpire zone grading is completely internal and no one has seen it, but it seems likely that umpires were being dinged for calling a zone that was too high, and gradually adjusted their calls in response.
Yeah I wondered if it was a Pitch/Fx thing only, but I would have guessed the effect would only occur within the first couple years of implementation and grading and then stabilize, when actually it has been increasing pretty much each year. Is something else also going on?
I don't think you could get experienced umpires to change their strike zone drastically over a season or two. It's got to be something that's deeply engrained in them, as much reflex as conscious. If they were instructed to call lower strikes, I think the most they could really do is just move their zone down fractionally.theapportioner said:
The same umpires are certainly calling different zones year by year. Here are some representative senior umpires over the past few years:Rudy Pemberton said:
Another thing that occurred to me was whether the zone changes through the season, incrementally, or whether it happens in jumps, one season to the next. Here are the zones month to month from 2012 through 2014:
What do umpires do in the off-season? Do they have training, or some practice in strike-calling, where they could be shown what the zone will be and practice calling it? Otherwise, it's odd that so many umpires would settle on the same increment each year.
The more I look into this, the more convinced I am that the Red Sox strategy is a "lower half of the strike zone" strategy and not a "ground ball strategy", which may be why they haven't felt a need to really focus on infield defense as much as they might.
To demonstrate this, let me give you seven names: Dallas Keuchel, Jose Quintana, Garritt Richards, Alex Wood, Alex Cobb, Hisashi Iwakuma, and Jacob deGrom. Call them the Keuchel Seven.
What do the Keuchel Seven have in common? Three things:
1. None of these guys was projected as a potential front-end rotation starter as recently as two years ago. I took a look at my 2013 Baseball Prospectus and collected a few quotes:
Quintana: "It's his turn to make adjustments, and as he lacks the raw stuff to blow hitters away, his best chance to return to adequacy will be to find another trick to add to his bag."
Richards: "Richards doesn't have a plus secondary pitch, which allows hitters to sit on the fastball and prevents him from racking up the kind of strikeout totals his velocity would suggest," [a scout] said,ranking him seventh in the system with the upside of a fourth starter.
Wood: "Ultimately Wood will need to develop a better breaking ball or a cutter in order to avoid the bullpen."
Cobb: "He's likely to occupty the fourth or fifth starter role for at least a few years, provided his command doesn't desert him."
Iwakuma: "an improved strikeout rate and peripherals that suggest he credibly fills a number-three slot".
deGrom got the biggest insult of all: the 2014 NL Rookie of the Year did not get even a mention in 2013 Prospectus, and to be fair to them after the 2012 season he was 24 years old and yet to crack AA, although he did have a very good season in high-A.
BP was a little higher on Keuchel himself, "When knows how to pitch" runs up against "not enough skill (yet)", something has to give. In this case, Keuchel did the giving."
2. All of these guys have had at least one season over the past two in which they pitched like a strong #2 or borderline ace. Quintana had the 9th highest WAR in MLB last year, 0.1 behind teammate Chris Sale (is there a more underrated pitcher in the league right now?). Iwakuma ranks #19 with 7.2 WAR over the past 2 years. Richards had a 2.60 FIP last year. Keuchel's was 3.21. Wood's xFIP over the past 2 years are 3.18 and 3.19. Cobb's are 3.26 and 3.33. If you were investing in starting pitching in the 2012-2013 offseason, these are seven of the smartest bets you could have made.
3. All of these guys have found success over the past two years pounding the crap out of the lower half of the strike zone. I'm going to post the pitch zone from Brooks Baseball for all of them if I can figure out how to do it, because really, they're all pretty remarkable. There are some real GB heavy pitchers on this list, starting with Keuchel and also Cobb, Iwamura. But Quintana isn't, and neither is Wood.
One other thing that is interesting reading through all these scouting reports: high baseball IQ is mentioned on a lot of them, including Keuchel, Cobb, Quintana and Iwakuma.
Keuchel:
Quintana:
Richards:
Wood:
Cobb:
Iwakuma:
Degrom:
There are a couple other guys who are borderline candidates for this list, guys who have had more success than expected and who are primarily low in zone pitchers but not quite as dramatically as these seven. Those include Keuchel's teammate McHugh, Tyson Ross, and our own Rick Porcello. The revival of Francisco Liriano might also be partially attributable to the falling strike zone.
To demonstrate this, let me give you seven names: Dallas Keuchel, Jose Quintana, Garritt Richards, Alex Wood, Alex Cobb, Hisashi Iwakuma, and Jacob deGrom. Call them the Keuchel Seven.
What do the Keuchel Seven have in common? Three things:
1. None of these guys was projected as a potential front-end rotation starter as recently as two years ago. I took a look at my 2013 Baseball Prospectus and collected a few quotes:
Quintana: "It's his turn to make adjustments, and as he lacks the raw stuff to blow hitters away, his best chance to return to adequacy will be to find another trick to add to his bag."
Richards: "Richards doesn't have a plus secondary pitch, which allows hitters to sit on the fastball and prevents him from racking up the kind of strikeout totals his velocity would suggest," [a scout] said,ranking him seventh in the system with the upside of a fourth starter.
Wood: "Ultimately Wood will need to develop a better breaking ball or a cutter in order to avoid the bullpen."
Cobb: "He's likely to occupty the fourth or fifth starter role for at least a few years, provided his command doesn't desert him."
Iwakuma: "an improved strikeout rate and peripherals that suggest he credibly fills a number-three slot".
deGrom got the biggest insult of all: the 2014 NL Rookie of the Year did not get even a mention in 2013 Prospectus, and to be fair to them after the 2012 season he was 24 years old and yet to crack AA, although he did have a very good season in high-A.
BP was a little higher on Keuchel himself, "When knows how to pitch" runs up against "not enough skill (yet)", something has to give. In this case, Keuchel did the giving."
2. All of these guys have had at least one season over the past two in which they pitched like a strong #2 or borderline ace. Quintana had the 9th highest WAR in MLB last year, 0.1 behind teammate Chris Sale (is there a more underrated pitcher in the league right now?). Iwakuma ranks #19 with 7.2 WAR over the past 2 years. Richards had a 2.60 FIP last year. Keuchel's was 3.21. Wood's xFIP over the past 2 years are 3.18 and 3.19. Cobb's are 3.26 and 3.33. If you were investing in starting pitching in the 2012-2013 offseason, these are seven of the smartest bets you could have made.
3. All of these guys have found success over the past two years pounding the crap out of the lower half of the strike zone. I'm going to post the pitch zone from Brooks Baseball for all of them if I can figure out how to do it, because really, they're all pretty remarkable. There are some real GB heavy pitchers on this list, starting with Keuchel and also Cobb, Iwamura. But Quintana isn't, and neither is Wood.
One other thing that is interesting reading through all these scouting reports: high baseball IQ is mentioned on a lot of them, including Keuchel, Cobb, Quintana and Iwakuma.
Keuchel:
There are a couple other guys who are borderline candidates for this list, guys who have had more success than expected and who are primarily low in zone pitchers but not quite as dramatically as these seven. Those include Keuchel's teammate McHugh, Tyson Ross, and our own Rick Porcello. The revival of Francisco Liriano might also be partially attributable to the falling strike zone.