The QO and the current CBA

[MakMan44]

 
I can't meaningfully argue the degree because I'm basically pulling a number out of thin air. Drew is asking for something like 4/56, right? Maybe his actual value is lower, and the Peralta comp is useful, but he's a year older and now has the PED tag attached to him.
 
Sans QO, I suspect Drew would have been able to field a few 3-4 year offers. With the QO, basically nobody is competing for his services. Sans QO, I'd expect offers in the 11-13M AAV range, and then see him take a 4/48ish deal. With the QO, nobody is at 10M AAV, right?
 
But, like I said, the speculative number is being pulled from thin air - we don't know value because the QO distorted things.

Hard to say. The Yankees offered a deal earlier but like I said, Drew wasn't thinking about playing other positions then. The Mets were "in the neighborhood of $9.5", whether that means higher or lower, I have no clue. I'd assume lower. I'm not sure what the Red Sox offers were. 
 
As for Peralta, I still think he's better than Drew. I don't see how Drew was going to get more than him even without a QO but as they say, it only takes one team. 

 

[OCD SS]

The outrage is that QO re-reserves players - who have earned the right to freely shop theimselves around in a very controlled market - from free agency. As it is, these players are basically owned by teams for many years and fought for the right to have teams compete for their services. Free agency allows them to balance the negotiations between themselves and the people making money hand-over-fist on their talents. This is bad for the marketplace of baseball.

 
No, it is bad for the player. The market place of baseball is doing just fine as evidenced by MLB's growing revenue (even if you just look at TV deals). Furthermore Drew (or any player with a QO) is not suffering under the reserve clause, and to suggest so is histrionic. He has a drag placed on his market, but that's it; that he has not been offered what he and his agent think he is worth is not even close to the reserve clause.
 
If you're going to discuss an ideal "free market" in MLB you also have to address competitive balance, MLB's monopoly power, and things like guaranteed contracts for players and  but I think that is outside the purview of this thread.

 

[Reverend]

I think what zenter is getting at, as per an earlier post of his, is that the QO is a bit weird in that it's a market intervention that only applies in practice not to everyone to a bizarre band of "pretty good" players.
 
If a player is worth substantially less in terms of AAV than the QO, then it won't be offered. (We know that teams, e.g. the Red Sox, are willing to build in a bit of a premium for shorter years [see: Victorina, Napoli, Gomes] which is why I say "substantially.") If a player is worth substantially more than the QO, then it will be offered, but it won't prevent that player from signing a longer term deal elsewhere because the loss of a pick becomes less important than getting a high end player; maybe that player gets a little less because of the pick, but it's not significant.
 
As such, there's this relatively small range of pretty good players--like, say, between $11.5m and $15.5m (I'm not trying to figure this out accurately right now) AAV range players--who are affected by the rule, while nobody else is--and we know in two years, only 22 players have been offered the QO. That's all kinda strange.
 
Edit: I also note that a disproportionate number of QOs have been offered by big market teams, suggesting that they have an advantage in being able and willing to pay a premium on a short contract if the player accepts.
 
Edit2: Of course, none of the 13 offers this off-season were accepted... so, if teams do view it as a risk, then only big market teams can afford to gamble on the risk so the whole system is a way to create a draft pick gradient towards big market teams. That doesn't seem... good.

 

[zenter]

 
No, it is bad for the player. The market place of baseball is doing just fine as evidenced by MLB's growing revenue (even if you just look at TV deals). Furthermore Drew (or any player with a QO) is not suffering under the reserve clause, and to suggest so is histrionic. He has a drag placed on his market, but that's it; that he has not been offered what he and his agent think he is worth is not even close to the reserve clause.
 
If you're going to discuss an ideal "free market" in MLB you also have to address competitive balance, MLB's monopoly power, and things like guaranteed contracts for players and  but I think that is outside the purview of this thread.

 
I'm discussing the effect of the QO on the market and free agency, which is well within the scope of our conversation. QO punishes players for not being: 1) owned (first 6 years), 2) mediocre, or 3) a superstar. If most players offered a QO cannot be signed to a deal they would otherwise get, they are effectively locked-in to the QO team.
 
No, it's not reserve-era, but the Red Sox can destroy a guy's market value if they so choose and get 1) a team-friendly 1-year deal, 2) a draft pick, or 3) a team-friendly multi-year deal. The thing is, QO means these guys are also forced to give other teams a team-friendly deal. Essentially, any team can selectively depress the value of a good free agent with the virtual click of button. And since there's no QO-limit nor rising rates for consecutive QOs, a good player could get himself caught in QO hell where the only worthwhile offer is the one from the current team that only kind of wants him.
 
This lock-in can have downstream effects on the overall free agent market and average salaries - above average guys will let teams buy out arbitration years and take lower-AAV contracts to avoid QO limbo. Players have less ability to switch teams via free agency without taking a hit. Injuries - classically an area of sunk cost - puts players out to pasture and lowers their year-to-year market value. That is bad for baseball.
 

I think what zenter is getting at, as per an earlier post of his, is that the QO is a bit weird in that it's a market intervention that only applies in practice not to everyone to a bizarre band of "pretty good" players.
 
If a player is worth substantially less in terms of AAV than the QO, then it won't be offered. (We know that teams, e.g. the Red Sox, are willing to build in a bit of a premium for shorter years [see: Victorina, Napoli, Gomes] which is why I say "substantially.") If a player is worth substantially more than the QO, then it will be offered, but it won't prevent that player from signing a longer term deal elsewhere because the loss of a pick becomes less important than getting a high end player; maybe that player gets a little less because of the pick, but it's not significant.
 
As such, there's this relatively small range of pretty good players--like, say, between $11.5m and $15.5m (I'm not trying to figure this out accurately right now) AAV range players--who are affected by the rule, while nobody else is--and we know in two years, only 22 players have been offered the QO. That's all kinda strange.
 
Edit: I also note that a disproportionate number of QOs have been offered by big market teams, suggesting that they have an advantage in being able and willing to pay a premium on a short contract if the player accepts.
 
Edit2: Of course, none of the 13 offers this off-season were accepted... so, if teams do view it as a risk, then only big market teams can afford to gamble on the risk so the whole system is a way to create a draft pick gradient towards big market teams. That doesn't seem... good.

 
Yes to all of this, especially the edits. Taking the intended effect - giving smaller market/budget teams compensation for losing good players - and comparing to actual outcome, we see that things under the QO regime are actually pretty bad, particularly for the players. Indeed, teams like the O's, Royals, and Pirates are starting to profit from a player development strategy started under the old CBA.

 

[MakMan44]

I actually think Rev's edits are the more important problem with the QOs. 

 

[lexrageorge]

I may suggest that the sample size of 2 years of free agency under this system is still relatively small.  
 
If we look at the top 15 ranked position players that were free agents this year, 9 were given the QO.  3 of them had club options in their contracts, each of which were renewed.  Of the remaining 3, only one was considered to be in the Top 10 (Salty); the other two, Hart and Peralta, were the 14th and 15th ranked position players.  Of those 9, you had 2 players from the Yankees, 3 from the Sox, and 1 each from the Cardinals, Reds, Braves, and Rangers.  Basically, the 2 biggest budget clubs had a disproportionate number of top ranked free agent position players; that's probably not completely unexpected when you think about it.  
 
The only position player outside the Top 15 that did receive the QO, Kendry Morales, was tendered by Seattle, not one we traditionally consider a "big market" club.  
 
For pitchers, the sample size was even smaller this offseason.  Of the Top 15 free agents, 2 were resigned by club option, 1 by player option, 1 was an international signing via the posting system, and 3 were ineligible.  Of the remaining 8, 3 received the QO from their current teams, and all were the top 3 ranked by the remaining FA's eligible to receive the QO.  Two of those players played for the Royals and Indians, again hardly big market teams.  And, honestly, once you get below Jimenez, it was awfully difficult to justify $14M/yr for the lower ranked free agent pitchers this offseason, unless you're fans of Ricky Nolasco and Scott Feldman and the perpetually overrated AJ Burnett.  
 
I don't think there's a question that some players have had their market depressed a bit by the QO process.  But that by itself doesn't make the whole process "unfair".  Nor is it necessarily biased toward the big budget teams; we would need a larger sample to make that conclusion. 
 
EDIT:  I'd also like to point that that while it's true that none of the 13 accepted their initial QO's, two of them (Napoli and Kuroda) did resign with their current teams at what probably would be pretty close to a market rate contract for those 2 players.  

 

[koufax37]

I think Reverend summed it up well.  The fact that all 22 offers were declined is also indicative of something, but I think we have identified this band of players who maybe shouldn't have declined.
 
I think I would define the band a little lower than you did if you are indicating AAV on a multiple year contract.  If you include $15M in the band you are talking about guys who are 3/45 4/60 guys, and I think they really fall into the higher group not to be that adversely affected.  So I would probably pick the $8m to $12m (again conceptually, not trying to be super precise) as the ones in that questionable band.
 
With the band of affected players, we can maybe throw a rough $5m value assigned to the signing team's forfeited pick, although this can vary significantly from the Brewers #12 pick this year, to the Mets 3rd rounder.  Bumping down a 3/45 by $5m isn't the end of the world, but dropping a 2/18 guy to a 2/13 deal is a much more significant result.
 
The big thing is that with players declining QOs (whether for higher market expectations or prioritizing job security), teams are somewhat emboldened to gamble on a player they like and could live with getting stuck with for a chance at a valuable pick.  This choice and the level of player they can reasonably risk extending a QO to depends on the expectations he will accept.  Pretend a team values the comp pick at $5m, and a player at $10m, and the chances of accepting a QO at 50/50.  They are betting $4.1m on a chance to win $5m on even odds.  However as Rev points out, even if this is a smart gamble, it may be an easier one for a rich team to chance than a poor team and that isn't so fair.
 
Even if teams get burned by accepted offers, extending them makes sense if they would be happy with the player on the roster, have him valued somewhat close, and think the chances of him accepting are somewhere well under 100%.
 
I think that this is much more likely the case on what happened with the Red Sox with Drew.  I think it is more probably that they valued him as a $10m player or less, valued the comp pick at maybe $5m, but the chances of accepting at less than 50%, making it a really smart bet to make EVEN if you value Drew at less than $14.1m and hope he turns it down.  This is way more logical and probable than the idea that they valued him at $14.1m or more and were disappointed or indifferent when he turned it down.
 
The moving parts here (other than player valuations which are the key part of any contract) are the valuing of picks, and the guessing at QO-acceptance probability.  I think teams are probably pretty emboldened by the 0 out of 22 history, but that will trend in the other direction either in anticipation of or reaction to borderline players accepting QOs next year in light of the Drew/Morales/Cruz situation this year.

 

[Hank Scorpio]

I think over the next few years we'll see some sort of balancing of this system.
 
As early as next season, players will be more open to accepting a QO, especially if they're in that $10-15M/yr ballpark value wise.
 
The balancing will happen when teams start getting stuck paying $14M/yr for players they don't want to spend $14M/yr on.
 
I'm not Ben Cherington, and I don't work for the Red Sox, but I can say with pretty high confidence, the Red Sox did not want Stephen Drew back for $14M. The qualifying offer was a calculated risk, based on the likelihood Drew would turn it down in favor of a multi-year deal.
 
Plan A was for Drew to turn down the QO, and run with Xander at SS, and WMB at 3B.
 
...and if that backfired, a likely Plan B was to go with Drew at SS, Xander at 3B, and shop WMB, quite possibly paired with Dempster or Peavy.
 
Had the Red Sox felt they could not land McCann, and there were no Pierzynski level players available this offseason, they may have very well given a QO to Salty, but not Drew.

 

[keninten]

Will players on a one year contract like Drew had with the Sox, want to sign with a small market team now, because they probably won`t be offered a QO? Just wondering if this will help small markets.

 

[Red(s)HawksFan]

Will players on a one year contract like Drew had with the Sox, want to sign with a small market team now, because they probably won`t be offered a QO? Just wondering if this will help small markets.

 
Perhaps.  But some of the allure of signing the one year deal with a deep pocketed team is that they can and usually will pay more on that one year deal.  Some of that might be paying for the premium of getting the QO draft pick, but some of it is plain and simply spending extra on a luxury item because they have it to spend.  Like renting a Cadillac or a Beamer when on vacation instead of going with the economical sedan.

 

[Reverend]

I think I would define the band a little lower than you did if you are indicating AAV on a multiple year contract.  If you include $15M in the band you are talking about guys who are 3/45 4/60 guys, and I think they really fall into the higher group not to be that adversely affected.  So I would probably pick the $8m to $12m (again conceptually, not trying to be super precise) as the ones in that questionable band.

 
This is a good point--I roughly centered the range I was considering on the QO number without incorporating the premium in exchange for short term contracts. So yes, the center would obviously be lower and I'm apparently lazier than I thought; nice catch.
 
 

The big thing is that with players declining QOs (whether for higher market expectations or prioritizing job security), teams are somewhat emboldened to gamble on a player they like and could live with getting stuck with for a chance at a valuable pick.  This choice and the level of player they can reasonably risk extending a QO to depends on the expectations he will accept.  Pretend a team values the comp pick at $5m, and a player at $10m, and the chances of accepting a QO at 50/50.  They are betting $4.1m on a chance to win $5m on even odds.  However as Rev points out, even if this is a smart gamble, it may be an easier one for a rich team to chance than a poor team and that isn't so fair.

 
This is, I think, a nice extension and illustration of what I was trying to get across. I would extend the point even more from this to point out that big market teams have greater opportunity to hedge their risk with multiple QOs; worst that can happen is that you are "hamstrung" with pretty good players for a single year.
 
SSS of course, but has any team besides the Red Sox and the Yankees offered multiple QOs at once?
 
 

I think over the next few years we'll see some sort of balancing of this system.
 
As early as next season, players will be more open to accepting a QO, especially if they're in that $10-15M/yr ballpark value wise.
 
The balancing will happen when teams start getting stuck paying $14M/yr for players they don't want to spend $14M/yr on.
 
I'm not Ben Cherington, and I don't work for the Red Sox, but I can say with pretty high confidence, the Red Sox did not want Stephen Drew back for $14M. The qualifying offer was a calculated risk, based on the likelihood Drew would turn it down in favor of a multi-year deal.
 
Plan A was for Drew to turn down the QO, and run with Xander at SS, and WMB at 3B.
 
...and if that backfired, a likely Plan B was to go with Drew at SS, Xander at 3B, and shop WMB, quite possibly paired with Dempster or Peavy.
 
Had the Red Sox felt they could not land McCann, and there were no Pierzynski level players available this offseason, they may have very well given a QO to Salty, but not Drew.

 
We will certainly see a new equilibrium, but I'm not sure it will be the best they could do and I think it will still be a bit weird for some players and possibly not great for teams. As per above and as GE37 nicely summarized, there is a weighted risk component with an upside that some teams are better situated to take than others. In the long-run, that benefits big market teams.
 
Not that there's anything wrong with that... 
 
And I agree it's quite plausible that the Sox didn't want drew at $14.1m. But I think it's also true they would have been ok with that outcome--that's the nature of the bet in a probablistic world. Not sure that means they shop WMB over a year, though. That they didn't offer a QO to Salty is an interesting area because the FO apparently was not willing to take what you call a "calculated risk" even though most of SoSH who voted in that thread I need to update expected he had higher worth.
 
 

He is not getting a good offer now because it's almost March, he has no leverage and few teams have money to pay him. The QO was a factor but I think we are overrating it. If he had been looking for 4 / 40 or 3 / 33 or something back in November, he probably would have signed. Instead he was looking for too much money, and the few teams with openings moved on.

 
I think you're in the wrong thread.

 

[Reverend]

 
Perhaps.  But some of the allure of signing the one year deal with a deep pocketed team is that they can and usually will pay more on that one year deal.  Some of that might be paying for the premium of getting the QO draft pick, but some of it is plain and simply spending extra on a luxury item because they have it to spend.  Like renting a Cadillac or a Beamer when on vacation instead of going with the economical sedan.

 
I don't know if I'd call it a luxury so much as just basic economics and trade-offs considering the different levels of risk of variable performance that increase as you extend time.

 

[HriniakPosterChild]

Even if teams get burned by accepted offers, extending them makes sense if they would be happy with the player on the roster, have him valued somewhat close, and think the chances of him accepting are somewhere well under 100%.

 
If a guy accepts your QO, you don't have to keep him on your roster all year. It's likely there is another team out there who will trade for him, since your signing him made QO poison pill go away. Send him out of town with a two or three million dollar check pinned to his chest, and you make a good trade more likely.
 
Don't want to carry him on the roster through June 15? You can trade him as soon as you sign him if he consents, and if you tell him consenting makes it more likely for him to play everyday, he probably will consent.

 

[PedroKsBambino]

 
The word silly I used as an adjective to describe qualifying offers that teams would have been less happy if they were accepted, not to describe their winning of the gambles on said offers.
 
I don't think any of the three teams in question would have been happier with their player accepting the offer.  I don't think their choices were haphazard or without thought, but I think each of the three thought the player was close enough to 1/14 to warrant taking the chance they accept to gamble for the chance at a valued compensatory pick.  But in the end I would expect each team happy with their player's decline, and happy that their gamble paid off.
 
You seem to indicate that the gamble of a chance to get a pick was not a factor, and each of the teams would have been even happier if the player accepted.  I speculate to the contrary, and each of the three value the player at less than 1/14, and would have been less inclined to take that gamble if they thought the player was very likely to accept.  The Red Sox wouldn't have offered Drew 1/14 if they weren't happy to have him on the roster, but I think that would have been an overpay given the value and current roster composition.  Not a gut wrenching franchise ruining overpay, but I don't think the Red Sox would have offered a QO if it weren't for the chance at winning a draft pick and wouldn't think that offer made sense to the franchise in a vacuum.  It isn't that they weren't willing to pay it, but I think they would prefer not to, and put it as a calculated gamble that it will be declined.
 
My 1/10 is my very rough estimate of Drew's fair value on a one year contract.  This isn't the thread for Drew's value, but I was implying a 1.8 WAR projected player when you have cost controlled alternatives who will likely outperform him is not worth more than you have been paying David Ortiz.  I think it is very likely that the Red Sox FO shared this value and liked Stephen Drew enough to take the gamble he accepted, but were happy to hear he did not.
 
Of course in your eyes I still have zero basis and not even an argument for that view.  And that instead of a calculated risk in pursuit of a draft pick and an expectation of player greed / desire for multi-year security, each team was saying "aw shucks Nelson, why don't you come back and play right field for us for $14.1 million".  In doing so I think you are missing part of the game theory that is going on here, and how it will change in the coming year if expectation that marginal QO candidates might be more likely to accept offers.

 
Just to clarify...
 
1) The teams who would be 'less happy' if an offer were accepted is totally unknown.  That's also a different standard than the one you stated before and I commented on.
 
2)  I have in no way whatsoever suggested that the chance to get a pick was a non-factor; it would be ludicrous to suggest that since it is the only reason to make a QO.  
 
3) As for game theory, again, I think teams primarily are assessing the player's decision making process, which includes the market but also a bunch of things about the player's own interests that you don't seem to consider: how long a contract might they get (the market piece, but remember it's more than one year of guaranteed money here in most cases), what role is available on the offering team, what opportunity exists in the near-term future with that team and how that impacts the chances for an extension, etc.   So, without those, I think you are considering a pretty different picture the players actually consider. That all 22 players turned it down is, of course, powerful evidence this is so.

 

[lexrageorge]

With regards to the 22 players that were offered the QO and turned it down, keep in mind that in at least 4 of those cases (Ortiz, Napoli, Kuroda [twice]), the player in question was actively negotiating a contract with their current team. The QO was essentially done by the team to give themselves some time and some leverage in the negotiations.  

 

[trekfan55]

I think over the next few years we'll see some sort of balancing of this system.
 
As early as next season, players will be more open to accepting a QO, especially if they're in that $10-15M/yr ballpark value wise.
 
The balancing will happen when teams start getting stuck paying $14M/yr for players they don't want to spend $14M/yr on.
 
I'm not Ben Cherington, and I don't work for the Red Sox, but I can say with pretty high confidence, the Red Sox did not want Stephen Drew back for $14M. The qualifying offer was a calculated risk, based on the likelihood Drew would turn it down in favor of a multi-year deal.
 
Plan A was for Drew to turn down the QO, and run with Xander at SS, and WMB at 3B.
 
...and if that backfired, a likely Plan B was to go with Drew at SS, Xander at 3B, and shop WMB, quite possibly paired with Dempster or Peavy.
 
Had the Red Sox felt they could not land McCann, and there were no Pierzynski level players available this offseason, they may have very well given a QO to Salty, but not Drew.

 
This is the main point.  As soon as players start accepting the QO teams will not be offering them at will.  The Red Sox were a perfect example of a team that offered the QO to a player they did not actually need.  Drew is a great SS and despite his incredibly low BA they kept playing him in the postseason, while displacing WMB in favor of Xander but I don't think the Sox really wanted to pay him 14MM and have him, Xander and WMB clogging up the left side of the infield. 
 
So if Drew accepts the Sox are in a bind. 
 
BTW the Sox said at some point that they made their QOs based on their willingness to pay them, sort of implying that Salty was not worth that money.
 
But again, the QO is a gamble sometimes, and at some point one team will pay.  This is similar to KRod accepting arbitration with the Brewers once (they were expecting to collect a draft pick) or Soriano with the Braves (who then had to trade him to the Rays) or even Graffanino with the Red Sox after 2005.  In all 3 cases the player wound up back with a team that really did not want him back and had to be dealt with.

 

[zenter]

So if Drew accepts the Sox are in a bind. 
 
BTW the Sox said at some point that they made their QOs based on their willingness to pay them, sort of implying that Salty was not worth that money.

Don't these to statements kind of self-negate? They wouldn't be in a bind if they were willing to pay.
 
More generally, a 1 year 14M deal does not really put any team in a bind because of the short length of the deal - teams always seem willing to overpay on one-year deals and 7+ year deals. Guys in the QO range tend to be the ones looking for 3-5 years.
 
And even if players start accepting QOs, there's very little stopping a team from putting a QO-hold on a guy in successive years - worst comes to worst they overpay a decent player by a bit each year. The potential benefit of getting an extra draft pick from 19 suitors is worth a one-time overpay. The benefit to the good-not-great player is a couple extra million now but the risk of never getting a contract again.

 

[OttoC]

...More generally, a 1 year 14M deal does not really put any team in a bind because of the short length of the deal - ...

 
Doesn't this depend on where the team is in relation to the tax threshold? Admittedly, that doesn't come into play with most of the teams but there are a few that it could bother.

 

[lexrageorge]

The Sox would not have been in a bind had Drew accepted the QO.  They would have returned with him in the starting lineup at SS, and he would have been trade bait mid season.  But they likely had a strong inkling that Drew was looking for the multiyear deal before they made the QO.  Not sure what they would have done if Drew indicated he would return on a 1 year deal for the right price.  

 

[koufax37]

 
This is the main point.  As soon as players start accepting the QO teams will not be offering them at will.  The Red Sox were a perfect example of a team that offered the QO to a player they did not actually need.  Drew is a great SS and despite his incredibly low BA they kept playing him in the postseason, while displacing WMB in favor of Xander but I don't think the Sox really wanted to pay him 14MM and have him, Xander and WMB clogging up the left side of the infield. 
 
So if Drew accepts the Sox are in a bind. 
 
BTW the Sox said at some point that they made their QOs based on their willingness to pay them, sort of implying that Salty was not worth that money.
 
But again, the QO is a gamble sometimes, and at some point one team will pay.  This is similar to KRod accepting arbitration with the Brewers once (they were expecting to collect a draft pick) or Soriano with the Braves (who then had to trade him to the Rays) or even Graffanino with the Red Sox after 2005.  In all 3 cases the player wound up back with a team that really did not want him back and had to be dealt with.

 
Qualifying your statement a little, as soon as players who are not worth them start accepting and the current 22-0 scoreboard changes a little, teams will probably lower their expectation on chances of being declined.  And as stated earlier, the QO to a player not valued at 14.1m is a calculated gamble with three parameters: team's valuation of the player, team's valuation of the pick, and team's expectation of the QO being accepted.  Players accepting will only adjust somewhat that third parameter for marginal players, so it will just change the risk calculation for a team, and not be a watershed moment.
 
Of course the Red Sox were willing to pay them, or it would have been a very risky move.  They get accepted early enough in the offseason that teams can shuffle around their plans based on it, rather than having acceptance being a payroll shock that otherwise cripples a team.
 
But it is very likely given that the replacement players in Drew's case are not replacement players and are cost controlled pieces with a fair chance of outperforming Drew, that the Red Sox valuation of him was nowhere near the QO, and their gamble was more based on the expectation of decline.  And say the Red Sox only viewed him as a 7m platoon triangle platoon/utility guy, they can still make a reasonable gamble if they put his expectations of accepting very low.
 
My main point remains that in the cases of Morales, Cruz, and Drew, and possibly a few others over the last two years, the teams were each valuing the player nowhere near the QO, were happy on the decline, and won a gamble on a draft pick based on their anticipation of decline being correct.  I don't think any of the teams would have been crushed or in a bind by an acceptance, but they would live with a one year overpay of a player they still like.
 
I think if Morales and Drew both suffer the fate of Cruz, players on the edge might be more likely to accept next winter, and teams might anticipate this with fewer QOs.  But when/if the Mets or an injury team rush to Drew's rescue, that might tilt the expectations back a little bit.
 
However, clearly players value job security and are probably more hesitant for one year deals than calculating robots would be, so I think that human factor might still keep the trend towards declining slightly higher than simple probabilities might dictate regardless of these outcomes.

 

[Saints Rest]

Many teams, for various reasons, are willing to pay a premium for a short-term deal be that a one-year deal or even a 3-year deal (cf. Victorino, Gomes, etc).
 
 
Many teams like the value (regardless of whether you consider it over-valued or not) of the draft pick that comes back for a player who turns down the QO to sign elsewhere.
 
Many teams (again regardless of whether you consider it over-valued or not) are hesitant to lose the value of the draft pick that is lost by signing a QO-player.

The latter two of these items put some suppression on the likelihood/total worth of a post-QO-denial signing; while the former inflates the apparent value of the player.

Let's say a player, let's call him Nelphen Druz, is offered the QO for $14million.  That makes Mr. Druz think that he must be worth $14million.  But in fact, his old team actually considers him a $12million player who is worth paying the $2m premium to only be on the hook for one year.  Maybe the team has a great prospect coming up; maybe the team has signing issues coming up in 2015 or 2016; maybe the team fears that Mr. Druz might be a long-term injury risk or that he might be a PED risk.  But Nelphen doesn't consider any of this, he just sees the $14million offer in front of him and thinks, well if I'm worth $14 for one year, I must be worth $55-60 million for 4 years, so I'll turn down the QO.

Now Druz is out on the open market talking to teams.  These other teams agree with the old team and considers him a $12million player, but now they have the QO to contend with, so they want to discount him by $2million (assuming that both teams value the draft pick's value at the same $2million).  So they would offer $10million for one year, but they know Druz wants 4 years.  So they consider the vaiorus risks involved and think that 3 years for $25million is more appropriate.  
 
Meanwhile our player, being incredibly self-assured about his value, can't imagine how the $14million for one year offer now looks like 3years/$25million, and is outraged.  "The system isn't fair," he cries, shaking his fist at the sky. His agent, kowtowing to the end, tells him "you are right; the system has screwed you over."

 

[wade boggs chicken dinner]

 
However, clearly players value job security and are probably more hesitant for one year deals than calculating robots would be, so I think that human factor might still keep the trend towards declining slightly higher than simple probabilities might dictate regardless of these outcomes.

 
Seems to me that $14M for one year provides a lot of security to a player, his wife, his children, his children's children, etc.  I actually think players value money, and in most of the cases, they got equal or more than the $14M.  They just might not have gotten exactly what they are worth.
 
There was an interesting part in the Sun article today about the Cruz signing and the market.  Article is here: http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-02-25/sports/bs-sp-schmuck-column-0226-20140225_1_dan-duquette-market-masahiro-tanaka.  Interesting quote is this:
 

So, did he or didn't he know that if he waited long enough he wouldn't have to chase the market, because the market would start chasing him?
 
"No, I didn't see that coming,'' Duquette said. "This is a new collective bargaining agreement. This is the first full year of the implementation, and I'm not sure people understood how the market was going to play out. I can't tell you we envisioned that the market would get to this point."
 
Not many did. Adam Katz, Cruz's agent, called it "a peculiar market," and it wasn't only because of the new system that diminished the bargaining power of free agents who got qualifying offers from their original teams.
 

 

[trekfan55]

To clarify, the Sox are in a bind if Drew had accepted (IMO of course) because they had other plans for the SS position.  It's true that Xander played 3rd base in the postseason, but their plans for 2014 were to insert Xander at SS and keep WMB at 3rd.  Drew would have been an extra wheel and at 14.1MM a pretty expensive one.  I don't know that they were seriously considering a longer term contract for Drew but it doesn't look like it.

 

[Rasputin]

To clarify, the Sox are in a bind if Drew had accepted (IMO of course) because they had other plans for the SS position.  It's true that Xander played 3rd base in the postseason, but their plans for 2014 were to insert Xander at SS and keep WMB at 3rd.  Drew would have been an extra wheel and at 14.1MM a pretty expensive one.  I don't know that they were seriously considering a longer term contract for Drew but it doesn't look like it.

 
I'm sure that when they made the QO, they told Drew that the intent was to use Bogaerts as the starting shortstop. If he'd accepted the offer, well, it would have been some expensive depth until they could trade him.

 

[Average Reds]

 
 
If a guy accepts your QO, you don't have to keep him on your roster all year. It's likely there is another team out there who will trade for him, since your signing him made QO poison pill go away. Send him out of town with a two or three million dollar check pinned to his chest, and you make a good trade more likely.
 
Don't want to carry him on the roster through June 15? You can trade him as soon as you sign him if he consents, and if you tell him consenting makes it more likely for him to play everyday, he probably will consent.
 

 
The bolded does not make any sense to me.
 
The "poison pill" you refer to is the loss of a draft pick, correct?  So teams will all shy away from signing a player because he'll cost the a draft pick, but they'll happily make a trade (in which they will give up value that presumably will be similar to the draft pick they would have lost if they signed him as a free agent) because the player no longer has the "poison pill" of a lost draft pick attached to him.
 
I think you are overstating the impact of the draft pick quite significantly.

 

[zenter]

I think it's psychologically, very difficult for a player to look at the QO as their best offer at that point in the off-season. The players who sign early (think Marlon Byrd, Ricky Nolasco, Peralta, etc) all get pretty favorable deals, or else they wouldn't sign early. So for Ervin Santana and Stephen Drew to hear rumors about what guys like Nolasco and Peralta are going to get and then to think the QO is the best they can do seems unlikely. Ultimately, there are a lot of players of similar expected production / value out there, and while the QO is certainly a factor, these guys need to make sure they sign quickly or else they risk waiting around with nobody left to dance with. 

 
This makes me wonder if there's a way to add balancing factors that allow players to be able to have a little more control over their future during the offseason:

• QO doesn't expire until March 15, but does have a restriction date of something like December 1.
• After restriction date, player can negotiate with other teams and continues to have poison-pill.
• If player accepts QO before restriction date, all is the same.
• If player accepts QO after restriction date, QO salary is lowered in value by like something 15% - waiting comes with risks.
• If player accepts QO after restriction date, team has 5 days to confirm continued interest. If the team doesn't want him, they can buy out of it for something like 15-20% of the QO value.
• If player accepts QO after restriction date and team exercises buy-out, player becomes unrestricted with no poison-pill.

This gives good-not-great (10-14M) players some leverage and adds some risk to teams. Not enough to make QO a bad idea, but to change the math slightly.

 

[OttoC]

There are a lot of things that we do not know. For example, a player who turned down a QC might later get a perfectly acceptable contract offer (years/money) and turn it down because he does not want to play for that team, he does not want to play in that league,  he does not want to be based in that part of the country. Maybe there are people associated with that team he does not like. Maybe the team has a hot-shot at his position in the minors and he is concerned he may end up switching positions or being a utility player before his contract ends..Maybe he does not want to transplant his family and is hoping to sign with a team closer to home.
 
Maybe the rule does not need to be rewritten.

 

[MakMan44]

 
This makes me wonder if there's a way to add balancing factors that allow players to be able to have a little more control over their future during the offseason:

• QO doesn't expire until March 15, but does have a restriction date of something like December 1.
• After restriction date, player can negotiate with other teams and continues to have poison-pill.
• If player accepts QO before restriction date, all is the same.
• If player accepts QO after restriction date, QO salary is lowered in value by like something 15% - waiting comes with risks.
• If player accepts QO after restriction date, team has 5 days to confirm continued interest. If the team doesn't want him, they can buy out of it for something like 15-20% of the QO value.
• If player accepts QO after restriction date and team exercises buy-out, player becomes unrestricted with no poison-pill.

This gives good-not-great (10-14M) players some leverage and adds some risk to teams. Not enough to make QO a bad idea, but to change the math slightly.

There has to be some balanced benefit to the teams for this a change to be made. Nothing about this benefits them. 
 
I can see why people think the QO needs to be changed and that's fine but moving the acceptance date back isn't a viable solution. The major reason being I think it's a little crazy to suggest that a team should have to wait all offseason to see if their finances are going to be radically altered. Your suggestion works a little better if there was no buy out but I just don't see the owners agreeing to anything along those lines.
 
EDIT: I also don't see the PA doing a lot to really change the system. Yes, there's a few players that are getting screwed but by and large, it's worked out pretty well for most other players. They're not going to stick their necks out too far for change and risk hurting the majority. You simply can not please everyone, especially when they have to work with another side that has vested interests that occasionally conflicts with yours.

 

[snowmanny]

Maybe agents, particularly Scott Boras, should stop being so predictable.  If Drew accepts the QO then it changes the calculus for teams going forward.  A few players taking a salary that is higher than the AAV they could reasonably expect on the open market seems the surest way to loosen this up.
 
The franchise tag in football seems way way more "unfair."

 

[jimbobim]

The problem identified somewhere up thread is one team has the power to substantially depress a market for a player by indicating at one point they would pay him a high salary for one year. Now as has been proven 22 times so far this offer is in reality a fake choice. Players who are in the position to accept a high value one year deal generally prioritize years over money in an effort to cash in prior performance for security on their terms. One way to prevent this would be to make a signing time period and at the end the player takes the highest offer to  the team and if it is willing to match the highest offer it can collect their draft pick compensation without artificially depressing the market of a player they only minimally wants.  
 
The other problem is analytics has become a dominant force in baseball front offices. Even with the fail rate of drafting college and high schoolers it is still the most efficient cheap and reliable way to build a baseball team. Therefore forcing a signing team to pay a relative premium for an above average but not necessarily game changing free agent  while also forfeiting slot money they can spend in the draft is essentially setting a industry going rate for second tier talent that is deemed not worth the cost of now and the future . 
 
Interesting range for compensation linked FA
Jiminez, Bourn, Gardner(who would've gotten the same treatment as Bourn) , - 5oish mill over 4 years 

 

[Chief Wahoo]

 
This makes me wonder if there's a way to add balancing factors that allow players to be able to have a little more control over their future during the offseason:

• QO doesn't expire until March 15, but does have a restriction date of something like December 1.
• After restriction date, player can negotiate with other teams and continues to have poison-pill.
• If player accepts QO before restriction date, all is the same.
• If player accepts QO after restriction date, QO salary is lowered in value by like something 15% - waiting comes with risks.
• If player accepts QO after restriction date, team has 5 days to confirm continued interest. If the team doesn't want him, they can buy out of it for something like 15-20% of the QO value.
• If player accepts QO after restriction date and team exercises buy-out, player becomes unrestricted with no poison-pill.

This gives good-not-great (10-14M) players some leverage and adds some risk to teams. Not enough to make QO a bad idea, but to change the math slightly.

 
That seems to make sense but as relatively complex as your solution is there are probably unintended consequences I haven't thought of as yet.  It would certainly lessen the negative impact to those good-but-not-great players but it wouldn't eliminate it.  I'm not sure what problems it might create.
 
Two alternate suggestions which would be simpler.  Not necessarily better, I'm floating a couple ideas here:
 
1. System as it is with the exception that the signing team doesn't lose a 1st round draft pick.  Loses a pick 2 or 3 rounds down.
 
or
 
2.  Keep draft compensation as it is but the QO must be for at least 3 years.  With a smaller AAV than the current CBA asks for.
 
I like 2 best.  Ostensibly the QO is supposed to keep small-market teams competitive while not preventing good players from cashing in.  As someone (Reverend?) mentioned already it's the big market teams who have been offering the QOs mostly and getting the extra draft picks.  A small team that might not be willing or able to pay 1/14 for a home-grown player might be willing to pay 3/30 (or something) for the extra years of control. 
 
Spitballing a couple ideas here. 

 

[HriniakPosterChild]

 
The bolded does not make any sense to me.
 
The "poison pill" you refer to is the loss of a draft pick, correct?  So teams will all shy away from signing a player because he'll cost the a draft pick, but they'll happily make a trade (in which they will give up value that presumably will be similar to the draft pick they would have lost if they signed him as a free agent) because the player no longer has the "poison pill" of a lost draft pick attached to him.
 
I think you are overstating the impact of the draft pick quite significantly.

 
No.
 
I think teams overvalue draft picks right now. I think a lot of us think that.
 
If I am trading for a guy who accepted a QO, and the team I am getting him from is pinning that check to his chest to make his deal a 1yr/$11m commitment for me, I may give up a fungible asset (who has options or does not require a 40 man roster spot) in my minor league system. 
 
The team who is getting the QO/FA off its roster is happy because they got out of a roster crunch. I am happy because I got a ~2 WAR player for $11m on a short committment.

 

[soxhop411]

Eric Fisher @EricFisherSBJ · 24m24 minutes ago

MLB qualifying offer for free agents set at $15.3M, up 8.5%. Reasonable jump given rev growth. Question is whether anybody accepts this time
 
https://twitter.com/EricFisherSBJ/status/519574430167470080
 
If the QO keeps going up every season at this rate, I would think it may get to the point where players (not the Lester level players) will accept them

 

[Minneapolis Millers]

And/or teams won't offer it.  It's getting pricey.  Plus, given the craptastic seasons put up by Drew and Morales, players might have been leaning toward accepting the QO even without the most recent bump in price.

 

[SirPsychoSquints]

 
If the QO keeps going up every season at this rate, I would think it may get to the point where players (not the Lester level players) will accept them
 

 
I don't understand this comment.  The QO goes up at the rate the top 125 salaries go up.  It's not just some guy picking a number.  Why wouldn't they remain in the same balance they have in the past?

 

[mauf]

Kyle Lohse and Michael Bourn were left twisting in the wind until March, but those guys ultimately got their long-term deals. I thought players would learn their lesson and be less cavalier about turning down QOs, but that didn't happen. I'll be interested to see if that changes now that Stephen Drew and Kendrys Morales have illustrated that the threat of being left out in the cold is not a theoretical risk.

 

[mauf]

 
Well, the "past" has been all of two years, so there's really not much to go off of there. Certainly this year, Drew and Morales would rethink their decision given another chance. 
 
If you're in that second tier of FAs that this idea applies to, the higher that one year deal is, the more likely you are to take it if teams continue to avoid these players like the plague. 
 
Edit: As MM alluded to, I think we see it become almost irrelevant over the next few years. IT'll get to the point that teams will worry if the player isn't prime and not offer it; or if they are that good, there's no chance they take it and someone signing them won't care about giving it up. 

 
I disagree. Teams are willing to overpay for the flexibility of a 1-year deal, so players who aren't worth sacrificing a first-round pick to sign will continue to receive QOs, even if more of those marginal guys start accepting their QOs.

 

[SirPsychoSquints]

Except that the alternative salaries are also higher, as all salaries are rising at this rate.
 
I understand using Drew's experience to modulate it, I just don't see why the rising price enters into it.

 

[snowmanny]

 
I don't understand this comment.  The QO goes up at the rate the top 125 salaries go up.  It's not
just some guy picking a number.  Why wouldn't they remain in the same balance they have in the past?

Good point. Although the luxury tax threshold doesn't increase so it does change the balance for a few teams.

 

[wade boggs chicken dinner]

Except that the alternative salaries are also higher, as all salaries are rising at this rate.
 
I understand using Drew's experience to modulate it, I just don't see why the rising price enters into it.

Not all salaries are increasing at this rate. Just the top 125.

 

[Mighty Joe Young]

I fail to see why people want to change the current system. The QO really only affects a tiny subset of prospective FAs. What bothers me is that people think of the players receiving the FAs as free agents and the QO as a drag or restriction on that free agency. But they ere , in reality, Restriced Free Agents. This was negotiated as part of the CBA. As more data points are acquired teams and agents and players will get a better handle on when to offer and when to accept.