Starting this thread as a place to discuss/debate the Patriots' passing game this season. Discuss schemes, concepts, routes, etc. also plan to use the All 22 for some post game breakdowns as well.
Giddy up.
Giddy up.
Tracking the Passing Game: 2013
- Thread starter mascho
- Start date
Okay, so I finally got the chance to take the time to go through the coaches tape and do some things in the wake of the Buffalo game. At the outset, let me say a few things. First, I haven't gotten the chance to set up my laptop to create/save/edit video clips just yet, so for Week 1 we're just going to be able to view edited stills. Still, after looking at the tape I think I'll be able to highlight some interesting stuff from the Buffalo game with stills alone. Hopefully I figure things out soon enough so that I'll add some video as the season progresses.
Second. For the most part I can read coverages pretty well, but there might be times when I read man as quarters, or things like that. I ain't perfect. If I were, I'd be wearing #12 and married to a supermodel. So there's that.
Finally, and building off of that, if I make any statements regarding reads/progressions/etc., they are assumptions based on my knowledge and experience. I could have them completely wrong, but I'll just put that out there as we start.
So first, some numbers. Here are Brady's numbers and ratings, courtesy of Pro Football Focus. (Let me say this, while I don't always agree with their rating system, PFF is a very useful tool for football analysis. Give it a check see. If you're interested in their premium stats, shoot me an PM and I can let you use my password).
So according to PFF, an average to above-average day for Brady, according to their numbers. ESPN's QBR stat also has this as an average to above-average day.
Since this thread is dedicated to all things passing, let's take a look at his targets and their numbers from Week 1, again courtesy of PFF:
Yikes. Looking at the film I would agree with the ratings across the board. Just lovely that the two highest rated targets will be shelved for the near future.
Anyway, let's look at a few stills that I think are worth checking out. Here is the pre-snap look on the first TD to Edelman:
We've got 3rd and 8 from the 10, so the Patriots could make a first down. They come out with trips to the left, with Thompkins, Amendola and Edelman top to bottom. Brady also has Sudfeld lined up on the LOS in a 3 point stance and Vereen to the "strong-side" of the formation. (Even though you've got a 3/2 split, most defenses use the TE for their strong/weak read, so we'll go with that for now).
Buffalo has a sub package on the field, and go with 4 down linemen, 1 LB and 6 DBs. They run man across the board bracket coverage on both Amendola and Edelman. The two guys highlighted in red bracket Amendola, and the two guys in blue bracket Edelman. What is really interesting is the respect they show Amendola on this play. They are determined to re-route him, and right at the snap the safety at the goalline jumps Amendola and chips him right at 5 yards off the LOS.
From top to bottom these are the routes run: Thompkins runs a seam/skinny post, Amendola a curl at 7 yards (might have been an option route but tough to tell) Edelman a seam/skinny post, Sudfeld a corner, and Vereen an out. My guess is that Brady's reads were based on coverage. Any man concept or Cover 2 concept he would be looking from Edelman then to Sudfeld and finally to Vereen, and iv he got a Cover 3 look he'd probably be looking Thompkins to Amendola (which is why I think Amendola was running an option route. If they got a Cover 3 look Thompkins would run off that corner and Amendola would break back to the outside away from coverage to an open area of the field).
If you run this play through, Edelman just beats our old friend Jim Leonhard (the DB who is lined up in a more traditional LB position) off the ball and it's a great throw and catch.
So let's take a look at the other TD to Edelman. Similar situation, a 3rd down in the scoring area. Here's a pre-snap look along with some routes diagrammed in:
Patriots again in a trips formation, with a TE and RB offset to the other side. (Vereen was initially split out wide left, but motioned back into the backfield). From top to bottom you have Edelman, Thompkins and Boyce.
Since the Bills had little success with man across the board earlier, they go Cover 2 over the top this time. Unfortunately, the Patriots have a great play called here. Thompkins runs the corner route from the middle of the trips, and occupies Leonhard. Sudfeld's route occupies the other safety, and the middle of the field is wide open for Edelman's post route. Just great play design, and an example of how routes can influence a defense. (Say, for example, Thompkins and Sudfeld run curls. The safeties won't be influenced to the outside as much, and the middle of the field would be a tougher throw for Brady).
Now, let's take a look at one more play I think is an example of not only great play design, but an example of how not to play defense given the situation: The big conversion to Amendola before the game winning FG. Here's your pre snap:
First, let's talk situational football for a second. Patriots have 3rd and 10 at the Buffalo 39 yardline. There is 1:20 left in the game. The score at the time of this play is 21-20, Buffalo. Obviously New England is in 4 down territory, but you want to keep them out of field goal range too, right? I mean, I know it's Tom Brady and all, but two factors come into play here if you ask me: One, the Patriots have yet to show they can go downfield, and two, if you get beat deep on a TD here, worst case scenario is you are down 28-21 with time left.
So why in the world do you go Cover 2, man under with your two safeties 12 and 15 yards off the line of scrimmage? I don't have a problem with the coverage, but the alignment. Play 6-8 yards off the ball and make any throwing windows tighter. This burns them. How?
Brady is throwing this route to the trips side of the formation. From the trips you have (bottom to top) Edelman, Hooman, and Amendola. (Edelman's split was wider, he motioned into a tighter trips and this is right before the snap). Edelman runs that short crossing route, Hooman runs a corner, and Amendola runs that "arrow" route, where he runs a diagonal to the sideline and then cuts back into the post at about 5 yards. The 3 DBs cover this extremely well, but for one problem. They switch, so the DB over Amendola picks up Edelman and gets a great jam on him. The DB over Hooman stays with him on Hooman's corner route, but the DB over Edelman in trying to get to Amendola on the arrow route can't get there in time because of the corner route by Hooman which cuts off his angle to Amendola. So who is left to try and react to Amendola? The safety, lined up 12 yards off the LOS. He can't get there until after the catch, and while he makes a great tackle, the Patriots convert and are in great position to kick the game winner.
Anyway, just some things to look at and ponder, as we await kickoff tomorrow night.
Second. For the most part I can read coverages pretty well, but there might be times when I read man as quarters, or things like that. I ain't perfect. If I were, I'd be wearing #12 and married to a supermodel. So there's that.
Finally, and building off of that, if I make any statements regarding reads/progressions/etc., they are assumptions based on my knowledge and experience. I could have them completely wrong, but I'll just put that out there as we start.
So first, some numbers. Here are Brady's numbers and ratings, courtesy of Pro Football Focus. (Let me say this, while I don't always agree with their rating system, PFF is a very useful tool for football analysis. Give it a check see. If you're interested in their premium stats, shoot me an PM and I can let you use my password).
| Snaps | Overall | Pass | Run | Penalty | Dropbacks | Runs | Attempts | Comp | Comp % | Yards | Yards/Att | TD | INT | SK | Drops | NFL Rtg | |
| Brady | 95 | 0.4 | 2 | -1.8 | 0.2 | 55 | 1 | 52 | 29 | 55.8 | 288 | 5.5 | 2 | 1 | 2 | 4 | 76.4 |
So according to PFF, an average to above-average day for Brady, according to their numbers. ESPN's QBR stat also has this as an average to above-average day.
| Pass EPA | Run EPA | Sack EPA | Pen EPA | Total EPA | Action Plays | QB Par | QB Paa | Total QBR | |
| Brady | 7.4 | -0.7 | -1.6 | 0.6 | 5.6 | 62 | 6.9 | 1.8 | 59.4 |
Since this thread is dedicated to all things passing, let's take a look at his targets and their numbers from Week 1, again courtesy of PFF:
| Snaps | Overall | Pass | Run | Blocking | Pass Block | Penalty | TA | Rec | % Caught | Yards | Yards/Rec | YAC | YAC/Rec | Lg | TD | DP | |
| Amendola | 60 | 3.8 | 3.7 | 0 | -0.1 | n/a | 0.2 | 14 | 10 | 71.4 | 104 | 10.4 | 32 | 3.2 | 24 | 0 | 0 |
| Edelman | 84 | 0.4 | 0.8 | 0 | -0.6 | n/a | 0.2 | 9 | 7 | 77.8 | 79 | 11.3 | 43 | 6.1 | 35 | 2 | 2 |
| Thompkins | 91 | -2.3 | -1.9 | 0 | -0.6 | n/a | 0.2 | 13 | 4 | 30.8 | 42 | 10.5 | 4 | 1 | 20 | 0 | 0 |
| Vereen | 57 | 3.9 | 1 | 2.3 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0.1 | 10 | 7 | 70 | 58 | 8.3 | 40 | 5.7 | 19 | 0 | 2 |
| Sudfeld | 20 | -1.1 | -1.3 | n/a | 0.2 | 0.1 | 0.1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Hooman | 81 | -1.7 | -0.7 | n/a | -1.4 | 0 | 0.4 | 2 | 1 | 50 | 5 | 5 | 1 | 1 | 5 | 0 | 0 |
Yikes. Looking at the film I would agree with the ratings across the board. Just lovely that the two highest rated targets will be shelved for the near future.
Anyway, let's look at a few stills that I think are worth checking out. Here is the pre-snap look on the first TD to Edelman:
We've got 3rd and 8 from the 10, so the Patriots could make a first down. They come out with trips to the left, with Thompkins, Amendola and Edelman top to bottom. Brady also has Sudfeld lined up on the LOS in a 3 point stance and Vereen to the "strong-side" of the formation. (Even though you've got a 3/2 split, most defenses use the TE for their strong/weak read, so we'll go with that for now).
Buffalo has a sub package on the field, and go with 4 down linemen, 1 LB and 6 DBs. They run man across the board bracket coverage on both Amendola and Edelman. The two guys highlighted in red bracket Amendola, and the two guys in blue bracket Edelman. What is really interesting is the respect they show Amendola on this play. They are determined to re-route him, and right at the snap the safety at the goalline jumps Amendola and chips him right at 5 yards off the LOS.
From top to bottom these are the routes run: Thompkins runs a seam/skinny post, Amendola a curl at 7 yards (might have been an option route but tough to tell) Edelman a seam/skinny post, Sudfeld a corner, and Vereen an out. My guess is that Brady's reads were based on coverage. Any man concept or Cover 2 concept he would be looking from Edelman then to Sudfeld and finally to Vereen, and iv he got a Cover 3 look he'd probably be looking Thompkins to Amendola (which is why I think Amendola was running an option route. If they got a Cover 3 look Thompkins would run off that corner and Amendola would break back to the outside away from coverage to an open area of the field).
If you run this play through, Edelman just beats our old friend Jim Leonhard (the DB who is lined up in a more traditional LB position) off the ball and it's a great throw and catch.
So let's take a look at the other TD to Edelman. Similar situation, a 3rd down in the scoring area. Here's a pre-snap look along with some routes diagrammed in:
Patriots again in a trips formation, with a TE and RB offset to the other side. (Vereen was initially split out wide left, but motioned back into the backfield). From top to bottom you have Edelman, Thompkins and Boyce.
Since the Bills had little success with man across the board earlier, they go Cover 2 over the top this time. Unfortunately, the Patriots have a great play called here. Thompkins runs the corner route from the middle of the trips, and occupies Leonhard. Sudfeld's route occupies the other safety, and the middle of the field is wide open for Edelman's post route. Just great play design, and an example of how routes can influence a defense. (Say, for example, Thompkins and Sudfeld run curls. The safeties won't be influenced to the outside as much, and the middle of the field would be a tougher throw for Brady).
Now, let's take a look at one more play I think is an example of not only great play design, but an example of how not to play defense given the situation: The big conversion to Amendola before the game winning FG. Here's your pre snap:
First, let's talk situational football for a second. Patriots have 3rd and 10 at the Buffalo 39 yardline. There is 1:20 left in the game. The score at the time of this play is 21-20, Buffalo. Obviously New England is in 4 down territory, but you want to keep them out of field goal range too, right? I mean, I know it's Tom Brady and all, but two factors come into play here if you ask me: One, the Patriots have yet to show they can go downfield, and two, if you get beat deep on a TD here, worst case scenario is you are down 28-21 with time left.
So why in the world do you go Cover 2, man under with your two safeties 12 and 15 yards off the line of scrimmage? I don't have a problem with the coverage, but the alignment. Play 6-8 yards off the ball and make any throwing windows tighter. This burns them. How?
Brady is throwing this route to the trips side of the formation. From the trips you have (bottom to top) Edelman, Hooman, and Amendola. (Edelman's split was wider, he motioned into a tighter trips and this is right before the snap). Edelman runs that short crossing route, Hooman runs a corner, and Amendola runs that "arrow" route, where he runs a diagonal to the sideline and then cuts back into the post at about 5 yards. The 3 DBs cover this extremely well, but for one problem. They switch, so the DB over Amendola picks up Edelman and gets a great jam on him. The DB over Hooman stays with him on Hooman's corner route, but the DB over Edelman in trying to get to Amendola on the arrow route can't get there in time because of the corner route by Hooman which cuts off his angle to Amendola. So who is left to try and react to Amendola? The safety, lined up 12 yards off the LOS. He can't get there until after the catch, and while he makes a great tackle, the Patriots convert and are in great position to kick the game winner.
Anyway, just some things to look at and ponder, as we await kickoff tomorrow night.
Thanks for the writeup, interesting read.
Did you look at Thompkins at all, and did you see positives? Im as novice as they come with breaking down film, but I watched last night for awhile with a focus on Thompkins and it looked even uglier than those numbers. Looked like he left tons of yards on the field on that short pass in the first quarter, missed blocks, didnt run good routes etc.
Did you look at Thompkins at all, and did you see positives? Im as novice as they come with breaking down film, but I watched last night for awhile with a focus on Thompkins and it looked even uglier than those numbers. Looked like he left tons of yards on the field on that short pass in the first quarter, missed blocks, didnt run good routes etc.
Stitch01 said:
Yeah, I took a look at Thompkins. It was pretty bad.
His first target was on a well set-up play action pass. They fake the stretch play to the strong-side of the formation and come back weak-side to him on a deep post. Bills are again in Cover 2, but the safety to his side freezes on the play-action fake. So Thompkins is open, the ball is there, and he lost his feet. Now, I try not to fault people for physical mistakes, but something as simple as keeping your feet is tough to forgive.
His second target is basically the same play..since it was there the first time, they come back to it. Play-action to the strong side of the formation, and they come back to him on a post route. Now, it looks like he broke the route off when Brady pulls the ball down, and he comes back towards Brady which is good. But the throw is wide. (This is one of those plays where it is tough to really evaluate what he did without knowing the play call. But I assume he made the right read given that he broke the route off and Brady seemed to be looking for him to do so).
The third target is, well, ugh. If I remember when I have access to my iPad I'll put up some stills, but it is a bubble screen to him. This could have gone for big yardage if he stayed with the play, but he bailed on it quickly and tried to cut inside towards the heart of the defense, for a minimal gain. It is really well blocked by Edelman and the OL coming out, and there is a hole to the sideline, but he gives up on it. I think this is the play you're talking about, and yeah, he left a ton of yards on the field if you ask me.
Fourth target, Brady looks to "sight adjust" his route at the LOS. Pre-snap, he taps his left hip towards where Thompkins is aligned. They throw a back-shoulder fade route to Thompkins, and the ball is right where it needs to be. Dropped.
Fifth target, he runs a good route. Split wide left and runs a delayed in cut. Brady is under pressure and two-hops it towards Thompkins.
Sixth target is a nice completion along the sideline. Tough to tell what the route is. It looks like Thompkins is running a go route and Brady motions for him to come back to him before throwing the ball. Tough to tell. Again, tough to really evaluate the route without the play call/reads.
Seventh target is an pivot/out route on 3rd and 5 in the opponent's territory. He runs a pivot/out route towards the sideline and fails to get both feet inbounds. Need a better effort there.
Eighth target, they come back to the bubble screen, but Buffalo sniffs it out. Really had no chance.
9th target. They are 1st and goal inside Buffalo's 10. He is split wide right with Amendola inside him in the slot. They run and out/slant combo, and Thompkins catches the slant route and gets to the 1. Looks okay on paper, but he goes to the ground as he is catching the pass and can't get up in time to get the ball in the end zone. This is a sign, if you ask me, of nerves/inexperience. He's so concerned with making sure he catches the pass that he goes to the ground and catches it with his chest. The play is there, and if he stays on his feet and catches it with his hands, he walks in for a TD. (I say this is a sign of nerves/inexperience based on personal experience. My first game as a WR was my sophomore year in college. Opening drive, 3rd and 10, and I run a comeback route at the sticks. Ball thrown to me perfectly, but I go to the ground and secure the catch with my chest. We get the first down, but I get a poor grade on that play in post-game film review. Why? As I was going to the ground to secure the catch, the CB covering me cover commits to the sideline and is out of position. IF I secure the catch with my hands and turn upfield, I have a good shot at taking this to the house. Same thing here. Thompkins is so concerned with simply making the catch, he doesn't stay with the play).
Last target. The very next play, 2nd and goal at the 2. They run play-action strong side and come back to him on a crossing route. Pre-snap, Brady makes adjustments, and it looks as if he is confused. As the play develops, it looks like he is going half-speed. Again, tough to know if that is by design. In short-yardage/goal-line packages sometimes the weak side WR gives the same slow crossing route look even on run plays, setting up the DB for when they go play action. Anyway, Brady tries to hit him, but it's incomplete.
So that's my take on each of his targets. He left some plays and perhaps some chances to score on the field. A rough debut, but these are things that can be fixed.
Yeah, the screen was the play I was talking about. It was set up to gain a lot of yards and he made a really bizarre cut into a ton of traffic rather than just going where the play was blocked. Wanted to make sure I wasnt seeing things.
IIRC Fourth route was the play McKelvin held him like the entire route.
Thought he screwed up a blocking assignment on an early Ridley run and whiffed one on a Blount run too.
Hopefully all just jitters.
Really appreciate the breakdowns.
IIRC Fourth route was the play McKelvin held him like the entire route.
Thought he screwed up a blocking assignment on an early Ridley run and whiffed one on a Blount run too.
Hopefully all just jitters.
Really appreciate the breakdowns.
This is an awesome thread, keep it coming. I hope the Thompkins stuff is nerves, because the Pats are going to need him.
Another resource to track is AdvancedNFLStats.com, founded by a former Navy F/18 pilot w/ a BS in aerospace engineering.
For WRs, they have Amendola as the #1 WR and Edelman as #11 after game 1:
http://wp.advancednflstats.com/playerstats.php?pos=WR
For QBs, Brady is at #12:
http://wp.advancednflstats.com/playerstats.php?year=2013&pos=QB&season=all
Same site also had NE as #1 in offensive team efficiency (Denver second):
http://www.advancednflstats.com/2013/01/2012-team-efficiency-rankings-final.html#more
For WRs, they have Amendola as the #1 WR and Edelman as #11 after game 1:
http://wp.advancednflstats.com/playerstats.php?pos=WR
For QBs, Brady is at #12:
http://wp.advancednflstats.com/playerstats.php?year=2013&pos=QB&season=all
Same site also had NE as #1 in offensive team efficiency (Denver second):
http://www.advancednflstats.com/2013/01/2012-team-efficiency-rankings-final.html#more
Here's yet one more look at that screen to Thompkins. A few images to review.
This is right when Thompkins got his hands on the pass.
And here is the view from when he decides to cut inside.
Same moments, but from the end zone camera:
And for giggles, here is me watching this play over and over again:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ua3y026LrLk
See, right there is the moment Thompkins breaks my heart by cutting inside.
Seriously, looking at this play the blockers do their jobs perfectly. Both the CB and the NB are down on the ground when Thompkins decides to cut inside. He has an alley right to the outside and to the sideline, and at that point he is one-on-one with Jim Leonhard. That is a matchup Thompkins should win in the open field. Worst case scenario, if he cuts outside he's held to just a 10 yard gain and a first down. He makes Leonhard miss and he's off to the races.
This is right when Thompkins got his hands on the pass.
And here is the view from when he decides to cut inside.
Same moments, but from the end zone camera:
And for giggles, here is me watching this play over and over again:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ua3y026LrLk
See, right there is the moment Thompkins breaks my heart by cutting inside.
Seriously, looking at this play the blockers do their jobs perfectly. Both the CB and the NB are down on the ground when Thompkins decides to cut inside. He has an alley right to the outside and to the sideline, and at that point he is one-on-one with Jim Leonhard. That is a matchup Thompkins should win in the open field. Worst case scenario, if he cuts outside he's held to just a 10 yard gain and a first down. He makes Leonhard miss and he's off to the races.
Now I think this may be a sliver of an evidence that Thompkins will show continued improvement as season progresses.
Taking the same play that mascho outlined above, with much better results. This play occurred during 1st Qt, at the 3:06 mark. Pats at on their 31 on 2nd-10 to go.
1. Pats are in a 4-wide set, with Leon Washington as the lone back. KT is lined up between Edelman (#11) and Boyce wide right (#82).
2. As the ball is snapped, Edelman (blue) tries to block Kyle Wilson (#20) and make a seam for KT. Pats OL does a good job starting their block assignments as well, starting with Vollmer (#76, orange).
What Thompkins does well: he no longer hesitates as in week 1. He squares up to the ball, and immediately takes the ball north. I believe this is part of his learning process, and seems obvious he was coached up (ahem, yelled at) during the short week.
3. However, the play is quickly in trouble. Edelman's bad angle costs him and Wilson is quickly onto KT (no knock on #11, but another reason to miss Welker). Vollmer also is 50/50 in getting his man (Darrin Walls #30, who replaced Milliner).
4. Now this is why Vollmer may be the best right tackle in the game right now. He quickly makes up ground, and easily throws off the much lighter Walls (orange). PFF has him at #6 rated tackle with +3.1 in week 1, and followed that up with an even better +4.3. (Week 1 leader Austin Howards, Jets, goes back to his normal self with a -1.6 grade.)
Thankfully, the suck that is Kyle Wilson also misses KT badly and takes himself out of the play. Edelman says "it's all on his ineptitude, ref".
5. Now as KT dashes forward, he's in trouble again as the impressive rookie Sheldon Richardson (#91) has him around the waist. Vollmer (orange) is out of the play after demolishing Walls.
6. However, Thompkins keeps his legs going and almost picks up the 1st down (9 yards gained). Extra kudos for Connelly (#63) to get quickly into the second level and slows down S Dawan Landry (#26).
Although the next run play by Ridley resulted in zero yards and Pats punted the ball, I think Thompkins is showing signs of making progress and will continue to be an important member of the receiving corp.
Taking the same play that mascho outlined above, with much better results. This play occurred during 1st Qt, at the 3:06 mark. Pats at on their 31 on 2nd-10 to go.
1. Pats are in a 4-wide set, with Leon Washington as the lone back. KT is lined up between Edelman (#11) and Boyce wide right (#82).
2. As the ball is snapped, Edelman (blue) tries to block Kyle Wilson (#20) and make a seam for KT. Pats OL does a good job starting their block assignments as well, starting with Vollmer (#76, orange).
What Thompkins does well: he no longer hesitates as in week 1. He squares up to the ball, and immediately takes the ball north. I believe this is part of his learning process, and seems obvious he was coached up (ahem, yelled at) during the short week.
3. However, the play is quickly in trouble. Edelman's bad angle costs him and Wilson is quickly onto KT (no knock on #11, but another reason to miss Welker). Vollmer also is 50/50 in getting his man (Darrin Walls #30, who replaced Milliner).
4. Now this is why Vollmer may be the best right tackle in the game right now. He quickly makes up ground, and easily throws off the much lighter Walls (orange). PFF has him at #6 rated tackle with +3.1 in week 1, and followed that up with an even better +4.3. (Week 1 leader Austin Howards, Jets, goes back to his normal self with a -1.6 grade.)
Thankfully, the suck that is Kyle Wilson also misses KT badly and takes himself out of the play. Edelman says "it's all on his ineptitude, ref".
5. Now as KT dashes forward, he's in trouble again as the impressive rookie Sheldon Richardson (#91) has him around the waist. Vollmer (orange) is out of the play after demolishing Walls.
6. However, Thompkins keeps his legs going and almost picks up the 1st down (9 yards gained). Extra kudos for Connelly (#63) to get quickly into the second level and slows down S Dawan Landry (#26).
Although the next run play by Ridley resulted in zero yards and Pats punted the ball, I think Thompkins is showing signs of making progress and will continue to be an important member of the receiving corp.
Hey, it's time for Week 2 Film Study!
(Do I have to?)
This is one of those weeks where you didn't want to wear the standard, equipment department grey t-shirt to film study. Wear something black or white. Because you're gonna be sweating bullets.
Again, let's start with the numbers. Brady, from PFF.
ESPN had his Week 2 QBR of 44.9.
It gets worse. Receivers and their numbers, from PFF.
Frankly, I think they were kind regarding drops. I have both Thompkins and Dobson with more than 1 and 3, respectively.
Let us look at some stuff, shall we?
Starting with the one and only TD. We all know that it was a great play call, and a well executed play-action, but looking at the coaches tape it is amazing just how well this play was executed. At the outset, they have 3rd and 2 at the +39, on their opening drive. Perfect time to go play-action, as any team defensively would expect you to keep the drive rolling on the ground. Especially when you are really, really thin at WR.
Another thing that cannot be discounted is the snap count on this play. Patriots went with a quick count. Most times they don't go with a quick count, only when they run the quick QB sneak do I really notice a quick count. Looking at the first still, you can see the effect.
That is from the moment the ball was snapped. Look at the defense. Four deepest defenders are over the middle of the field. I know the Patriots came out with a OT eligible formation, but they still had Dobson on the wing. Hard to imagine that the Jets planned on not having someone at least near him. So between the situation and the quick count, they were surely thinking run.
Also regarding alignment, look at the depths of those four circled defenders at the snap. Keep their depth in mind as we go through this.
As indicated, this is a two receiver route. Thompkins runs a backside post, and Dobson looks to chip the DE/OLB and then breaks upfield.
This is right after the execution of the play fake. Look at the defender's depths now, in comparison to their depth at the snap. Each defender came towards the LOS. Their deepest player went from the 31 to the 35. Look at their angles. Each of them is headed toward the RB, towards the execution of the playfake. None of those defenders is even looking towards Dobson. An even better angle is this one, from the endzone camera:
Endzone view of the fake, right as it is being made.
Look at their helmets. Not a one is looking anywhere else.
More will come when the Game Rewind app is back up and running, as it isn't available during games. And by "more," I mean maybe one other decent play that was executed, and then a whole ton of crappy plays to digest.
(Do I have to?)
This is one of those weeks where you didn't want to wear the standard, equipment department grey t-shirt to film study. Wear something black or white. Because you're gonna be sweating bullets.
Again, let's start with the numbers. Brady, from PFF.
| Snaps | Overall | Pass | Run | Penalty | Dropbacks | Attempts | Completion | Comp % | Yards | Yards/Att | TD | INT | Sacks | NFL Rtg | |
| Brady | 66 | -0.1 | -0.3 | 0 | 0.2 | 40 | 39 | 19 | 48.7 | 185 | 4.7 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 71 |
ESPN had his Week 2 QBR of 44.9.
It gets worse. Receivers and their numbers, from PFF.
| Snaps | Overall | Pass | Run | Blocking | Penalty | Targets | Receptions | % Caught | Yards | Yards/Rec | YAC | YAC/Rec | Long | TD | DP | |
| Edelman | 66 | 1.6 | 1.7 | 0.3 | -0.6 | 0.2 | 18 | 13 | 72.2 | 78 | 6 | 51 | 3.9 | 10 | 0 | 0 |
| Thompkins | 55 | -0.8 | -0.8 | 0 | -0.1 | 0.1 | 7 | 2 | 28.6 | 47 | 23.5 | 13 | 6.5 | 38 | 0 | 1 |
| Dobson | 34 | -2.3 | -2.4 | 0 | 0 | 0.1 | 10 | 3 | 30 | 56 | 18.7 | 36 | 12 | 39 | 1 | 3 |
Frankly, I think they were kind regarding drops. I have both Thompkins and Dobson with more than 1 and 3, respectively.
Let us look at some stuff, shall we?
Starting with the one and only TD. We all know that it was a great play call, and a well executed play-action, but looking at the coaches tape it is amazing just how well this play was executed. At the outset, they have 3rd and 2 at the +39, on their opening drive. Perfect time to go play-action, as any team defensively would expect you to keep the drive rolling on the ground. Especially when you are really, really thin at WR.
Another thing that cannot be discounted is the snap count on this play. Patriots went with a quick count. Most times they don't go with a quick count, only when they run the quick QB sneak do I really notice a quick count. Looking at the first still, you can see the effect.
That is from the moment the ball was snapped. Look at the defense. Four deepest defenders are over the middle of the field. I know the Patriots came out with a OT eligible formation, but they still had Dobson on the wing. Hard to imagine that the Jets planned on not having someone at least near him. So between the situation and the quick count, they were surely thinking run.
Also regarding alignment, look at the depths of those four circled defenders at the snap. Keep their depth in mind as we go through this.
As indicated, this is a two receiver route. Thompkins runs a backside post, and Dobson looks to chip the DE/OLB and then breaks upfield.
This is right after the execution of the play fake. Look at the defender's depths now, in comparison to their depth at the snap. Each defender came towards the LOS. Their deepest player went from the 31 to the 35. Look at their angles. Each of them is headed toward the RB, towards the execution of the playfake. None of those defenders is even looking towards Dobson. An even better angle is this one, from the endzone camera:
Endzone view of the fake, right as it is being made.
Look at their helmets. Not a one is looking anywhere else.
More will come when the Game Rewind app is back up and running, as it isn't available during games. And by "more," I mean maybe one other decent play that was executed, and then a whole ton of crappy plays to digest.
Okay. Another thing I wanted to look at were all the targets to Edelman. Given the uncertainty over the rest of the receiving corps, and what we saw from Dobson and Thompkins as the game progressed, I went into my review of the tape with two ideas in mind: One, the Patriots must have done things with Edelman pre-snap, specifically a lot of motion, to get him in favorable match ups, and two, the Jets must have changed their coverage as the game progressed, specifically at least giving him double coverage or a ton of safety help.
I put together this table as I went through.
Two things jumped out at me after this exercise. One, the Patriots did not use a ton of motion to get him open. Of the times he was targeted, he was only in motion for five of those targets. Granted, four were completions (actually, five should have been, but we will get to that). So having blown up that theory, my second was blown up shortly thereafter. Looking again at the coverages the Jets put out there, they didn't change much as the game progressed. Cover 1, Cover 2 and Man. They double him once, and only a few times did they put safety help shaded to him.
Also, look at the routes he ran. Only two were over 8 yards, the double move he put on Cromartie early that should have been a TD (we'll get to that) and that 10 yard out, which really was another double move. Everything else was underneath. Given that, you would think the Jets would change things up. Didn't happen.
Let's look at some stills to analyze this further.
This is right at the snap, first offensive play of the game. Edelman (as indicated in the table) went in motion (in-and-out, often termed "zig-zag") pre-snap. Last week I outlined how routes that are not even reads for a QB can be important in a play's success, on the big conversion to Amendola. Same thing here. Jets are in Cover 1 (man underneath for everyone but the FS, who is free to roam). Hooman runs (if you can call it that) a seam route off the LOS, taking the LB circled with him. Ridley runs an out out of the backfield, which occupies the MLB. Edelman runs a 5 yard in. The CB covering him again has trouble staying with him, as his route to Edelman is influenced by Hooman's seam route. The FS has to give some respect to the seam route, and can't get to Edelman before the pass is completed.
Here's another still to illustrate this concept.
2nd and 7, again on the first drive. Patriots split Develin, a glorified FB, out wide in this single-back look. Jets again in Cover 1. Develin runs that go route along the sideline, and Edelman has that 5 yard route that is indicated. Look at the depth of the FS (this is at the snap). If you play this through, the FS is forced to at least pay attention to that go route from Develin, again leaving Edelman one-one-one with a slot corner, a favorable matchup.
Now, I indicated that the Jets didn't make a lot of changes to their scheme as the game progressed to try and stop Edelman, which is true. But they did make some subtle changes which I'll point out.
This is from a play on the second drive.
In the table above, I indicated that this is man coverage. You've basically got "hat on a hat" across the board. But look at the cushion given Edelman. This is on 3rd and 7 early in the game. There's a 9 yard cushion here. Patriots run a bubble screen to Edelman, which goes for five, but they fail to convert the first down.
Now, later in the game the Jets do try something a little different on Edelman, with no success. This is in the 4th quarter. Jets have a Cover 2 look but walk an OLB out over Edelman before the snap, and cheat the weak side safety over Edelman and down towards the LOS. (Look at the difference in alignments for the safeties). Basically they roll a Cover 2 into Cover 1 at the snap of the ball. The FS bails out, and the OLB covers Edelman with the SS helping. Edelman runs a stutter/out double move, and the Patriots make the completion. See below.
Now, I want to come back to depth and motion, to breakdown the final completion to Edelman which ices the game. The two stills below are what I am looking at. These bring together some of the concepts I've already illustrated. 3rd and 5, 3 minutes left, Patriots on their -35 in a 3 point game. Edelman is split wide left and motions into a "stack" alignment. This is from the snap. In the chart above I have this as Cover 2, but it is really a combo coverage. The Jets have a Cover 2 look to the strong side of the formation (bottom of the screen). They come back with Cover 4 to the weak side. But look at the alignment of the CB and FS to Edelman's side of the formation: 10 and 12 yards off the LOS, respectively. Again, 3rd and 5 late in a 3 point game. For the second week in a row I am dumbfounded as to the depth of safeties on a big third down play.
Looking again at the weak side of the formation, you have four defenders responsible for 2 WRs. Thompkins runs a fade to the outside and occupies the outside DB. Edelman runs the in route indicated, and is covered only by the ILB. The underneath CB covers the flat weak-side, and basically sits in open space watching the play. As for the FS, he freezes. Look at the second image. This is right before Brady makes the throw. Again, knowing the situation and the scheme, you have an ILB covering a slot receiver. The FS in this scheme has only 1 receiver anywhere near his zone: Edelman. But starting 12 yards off the LOS, he can't give enough help. Throw and catch are made and the Patriots can keep the clock moving.
So, that's the Edelman part of the program. More later when I feel up to the task of making Dobson and Thompkins look good.
I put together this table as I went through.
| Target | D/D | Motion | Motion/T | Coverage | Route | Completion |
| 1 | 1st and 10 | Y | In/Out | Cover 1 | 5 yard in | Yes |
| 2 | 2nd and 7 | N | N/A | Cover 1 | 5 yard out | Yes |
| 3 | 1st and 10 | Y | Out | Cover 3 | Stop/Go | No |
| 4 | 3rd and 7 | N | N/A | Man | Bubble | Yes |
| 5 | 1st and G | N | N/A | Man | Slant | No |
| 6 | 1st and 10 | N | N/A | Cover 2 | 5 yard out | No |
| 7 | 1st and 10 | N | N/A | Cover 2 | Slant | No |
| 8 | 1st and 10 | N | N/A | Cover 1 | 5 yard out | Yes |
| 9 | 2nd and 9 | N | N/A | Cover 2 | 5 yard out | Yes |
| 10 | 2nd and 9 | N | N/A | Cover 1 | Slant | Yes |
| 11 | 3rd and 9 | Y | In/Out | Man | Slant | Yes |
| 12 | 1st and 10 | N | N/A | Cover 1 | 5 yard out | Yes |
| 13 | 2nd and 9 | N | N/A | Cover 2 | 10 Yard Out | Yes |
| 14 | 2nd and 11 | Y | In/Out | Cover 1 | 5 yard in | Yes |
| 15 | 2nd and 5 | N | N/A | Cover 1 | Bubble | Yes |
| 16 | 3rd and 5 | Y | In | Cover 3 | 5 Yard In | Yes |
Two things jumped out at me after this exercise. One, the Patriots did not use a ton of motion to get him open. Of the times he was targeted, he was only in motion for five of those targets. Granted, four were completions (actually, five should have been, but we will get to that). So having blown up that theory, my second was blown up shortly thereafter. Looking again at the coverages the Jets put out there, they didn't change much as the game progressed. Cover 1, Cover 2 and Man. They double him once, and only a few times did they put safety help shaded to him.
Also, look at the routes he ran. Only two were over 8 yards, the double move he put on Cromartie early that should have been a TD (we'll get to that) and that 10 yard out, which really was another double move. Everything else was underneath. Given that, you would think the Jets would change things up. Didn't happen.
Let's look at some stills to analyze this further.
This is right at the snap, first offensive play of the game. Edelman (as indicated in the table) went in motion (in-and-out, often termed "zig-zag") pre-snap. Last week I outlined how routes that are not even reads for a QB can be important in a play's success, on the big conversion to Amendola. Same thing here. Jets are in Cover 1 (man underneath for everyone but the FS, who is free to roam). Hooman runs (if you can call it that) a seam route off the LOS, taking the LB circled with him. Ridley runs an out out of the backfield, which occupies the MLB. Edelman runs a 5 yard in. The CB covering him again has trouble staying with him, as his route to Edelman is influenced by Hooman's seam route. The FS has to give some respect to the seam route, and can't get to Edelman before the pass is completed.
Here's another still to illustrate this concept.
2nd and 7, again on the first drive. Patriots split Develin, a glorified FB, out wide in this single-back look. Jets again in Cover 1. Develin runs that go route along the sideline, and Edelman has that 5 yard route that is indicated. Look at the depth of the FS (this is at the snap). If you play this through, the FS is forced to at least pay attention to that go route from Develin, again leaving Edelman one-one-one with a slot corner, a favorable matchup.
Now, I indicated that the Jets didn't make a lot of changes to their scheme as the game progressed to try and stop Edelman, which is true. But they did make some subtle changes which I'll point out.
This is from a play on the second drive.
In the table above, I indicated that this is man coverage. You've basically got "hat on a hat" across the board. But look at the cushion given Edelman. This is on 3rd and 7 early in the game. There's a 9 yard cushion here. Patriots run a bubble screen to Edelman, which goes for five, but they fail to convert the first down.
Now, later in the game the Jets do try something a little different on Edelman, with no success. This is in the 4th quarter. Jets have a Cover 2 look but walk an OLB out over Edelman before the snap, and cheat the weak side safety over Edelman and down towards the LOS. (Look at the difference in alignments for the safeties). Basically they roll a Cover 2 into Cover 1 at the snap of the ball. The FS bails out, and the OLB covers Edelman with the SS helping. Edelman runs a stutter/out double move, and the Patriots make the completion. See below.
Now, I want to come back to depth and motion, to breakdown the final completion to Edelman which ices the game. The two stills below are what I am looking at. These bring together some of the concepts I've already illustrated. 3rd and 5, 3 minutes left, Patriots on their -35 in a 3 point game. Edelman is split wide left and motions into a "stack" alignment. This is from the snap. In the chart above I have this as Cover 2, but it is really a combo coverage. The Jets have a Cover 2 look to the strong side of the formation (bottom of the screen). They come back with Cover 4 to the weak side. But look at the alignment of the CB and FS to Edelman's side of the formation: 10 and 12 yards off the LOS, respectively. Again, 3rd and 5 late in a 3 point game. For the second week in a row I am dumbfounded as to the depth of safeties on a big third down play.
Looking again at the weak side of the formation, you have four defenders responsible for 2 WRs. Thompkins runs a fade to the outside and occupies the outside DB. Edelman runs the in route indicated, and is covered only by the ILB. The underneath CB covers the flat weak-side, and basically sits in open space watching the play. As for the FS, he freezes. Look at the second image. This is right before Brady makes the throw. Again, knowing the situation and the scheme, you have an ILB covering a slot receiver. The FS in this scheme has only 1 receiver anywhere near his zone: Edelman. But starting 12 yards off the LOS, he can't give enough help. Throw and catch are made and the Patriots can keep the clock moving.
So, that's the Edelman part of the program. More later when I feel up to the task of making Dobson and Thompkins look good.
This is outstanding stuff, mascho.
It's possible the Jets did alter their coverage on Edelman, but it showed up more on plays where the Pats didn't target him. That's a lot more work to track, but might be worth keeping an eye on while / if you look at the Dobson / Thompkins plays.mascho said:
Thanks SN. You're totally right about looking at when Edelman wasn't targeted. (It would make sense that if the Jets rolled coverage to him Brady wouldn't throw to him, right?) I'll keep that in mind.
Good look at the passing game by Grantland
http://www.grantland.com/blog/the-triangle/post/_/id/75301/pass-atlas-brady-and-the-scamps
http://www.grantland.com/blog/the-triangle/post/_/id/75301/pass-atlas-brady-and-the-scamps
Baka raised this in the Game Ball Thread:
At the outset, it's still tough to try and break down plays/reads/etc without knowing the exact progressions Brady is given. Talking about this one play in particular, I made the assumption that Brady's reads were as follows: Quick look to the two deep routes, then to Sudfeld, then to the check down. It is certainly possible that the two deep routes were not even in his progression, as there are always plays that have decoy routes. It is also possible that Brady bailed on the deep routes too early. Again, tough to know exactly how/what his cues are on a given play.
As to the more global question, as to how deep throws are completed, I'll raise a few points.
First, I indicated that his read on the play in question could have been a "quick look to the deep routes." Well, there is a lot of grey in that read. As I indicated (and I hope to illustrate when the coaches tape is available) Brady did look deep on the play in question and as far as I can tell, when he came off the two routes, both Edelman and Thompkins had defenders with them. Now, Brady didn't pull the trigger and then came to Sudfeld. Other QBs might have considered a WR running at full stride with a DB next to him to be open. Here is probably where an element of trust and confidence comes into play. Not to bring up a guy from days gone by, but does anyone doubt that if it were Moss running that route, and he had a defender next to him, Brady takes a deep shot? Or if Stafford and Calvin Johnson are executing the same play, Stafford lets it fly?
Now, regarding the general concept of making reads from "deep to short" or "high to low" let me state at the outset that that's based on my experience and what I was taught and what I've coached. Maybe there are offenses out there that teach things differently, but I doubt it.
Going back to this play in question, from the time the ball is snapped to when Brady comes off the deep route and looks to Sudfeld, 3.53 seconds elapse. When he throws to Sudfeld, 4.19 seconds have elapsed post-snap. Between his playfake and his drop, he has taken an eight yard drop.
Say he looks at Sudfeld and then comes back to Thompkins, by that time over 4.3 seconds will have elapsed. Two things come into play. First, that's a long time when it comes to pass protection in the NFL. Second, given that 4.3 seconds have elapsed, and you have receivers running away from you, Thompkins is likely 35-40 yards downfield (from the line of scrimmage) at that point. Brady's taken an 8 yard drop. So he's got 40+ yards between him and his target already, meaning a throw at that point will have to travel about 60 on the fly to be completed. Can it be done? Sure. Has it been done? Yep. But it is a much, much lower percentage throw at that point, and one that is likely to be under thrown (think the throw to Gronk in the Super Bowl that was picked).
Now, that isn't to say that there are plays that are designed to be deep throws, where a QB is required to give it time to develop. Consider a basic double slot formation, with four vertical routes (or called "all go" by some). If that is run against, say, Cover 1 or Cover 3, the QB's job is pretty simple: Influence the FS with his eyes in one direction or the other, and come back and hit the other slot receiver on his go route. The QB has to give it time to develop, has to give it time for the FS to bite, and then has to come back and throw to the other side of the field.
I hope that kinda makes sense and addresses the questions...if not I can try and make more sense.
bakahump said:
At the outset, it's still tough to try and break down plays/reads/etc without knowing the exact progressions Brady is given. Talking about this one play in particular, I made the assumption that Brady's reads were as follows: Quick look to the two deep routes, then to Sudfeld, then to the check down. It is certainly possible that the two deep routes were not even in his progression, as there are always plays that have decoy routes. It is also possible that Brady bailed on the deep routes too early. Again, tough to know exactly how/what his cues are on a given play.
As to the more global question, as to how deep throws are completed, I'll raise a few points.
First, I indicated that his read on the play in question could have been a "quick look to the deep routes." Well, there is a lot of grey in that read. As I indicated (and I hope to illustrate when the coaches tape is available) Brady did look deep on the play in question and as far as I can tell, when he came off the two routes, both Edelman and Thompkins had defenders with them. Now, Brady didn't pull the trigger and then came to Sudfeld. Other QBs might have considered a WR running at full stride with a DB next to him to be open. Here is probably where an element of trust and confidence comes into play. Not to bring up a guy from days gone by, but does anyone doubt that if it were Moss running that route, and he had a defender next to him, Brady takes a deep shot? Or if Stafford and Calvin Johnson are executing the same play, Stafford lets it fly?
Now, regarding the general concept of making reads from "deep to short" or "high to low" let me state at the outset that that's based on my experience and what I was taught and what I've coached. Maybe there are offenses out there that teach things differently, but I doubt it.
Going back to this play in question, from the time the ball is snapped to when Brady comes off the deep route and looks to Sudfeld, 3.53 seconds elapse. When he throws to Sudfeld, 4.19 seconds have elapsed post-snap. Between his playfake and his drop, he has taken an eight yard drop.
Say he looks at Sudfeld and then comes back to Thompkins, by that time over 4.3 seconds will have elapsed. Two things come into play. First, that's a long time when it comes to pass protection in the NFL. Second, given that 4.3 seconds have elapsed, and you have receivers running away from you, Thompkins is likely 35-40 yards downfield (from the line of scrimmage) at that point. Brady's taken an 8 yard drop. So he's got 40+ yards between him and his target already, meaning a throw at that point will have to travel about 60 on the fly to be completed. Can it be done? Sure. Has it been done? Yep. But it is a much, much lower percentage throw at that point, and one that is likely to be under thrown (think the throw to Gronk in the Super Bowl that was picked).
Now, that isn't to say that there are plays that are designed to be deep throws, where a QB is required to give it time to develop. Consider a basic double slot formation, with four vertical routes (or called "all go" by some). If that is run against, say, Cover 1 or Cover 3, the QB's job is pretty simple: Influence the FS with his eyes in one direction or the other, and come back and hit the other slot receiver on his go route. The QB has to give it time to develop, has to give it time for the FS to bite, and then has to come back and throw to the other side of the field.
I hope that kinda makes sense and addresses the questions...if not I can try and make more sense.
I've been super busy with life, but just wanted to pop in here and say good job Mascho. Awesome stuff so far this year.
To echo, KFP awesome stuff in this thread, Mascho.mascho said:
To give the above snippet some context, Ben Muth has found in the past that the median sack time in the NFL is 2.8 seconds. If Brady is coming off the deep route at 3.5 seconds, this tells me that the play was definitely designed there and that he waited about as long as possible to allow something to develop. Whether he should have chucked it up anyway, I don't know. But there's no way he's looking back to that route once he comes off it - his mental clock is already probably at red alert time and he's looking to get rid of the ball somewhere else ASAP.
I haven't rewatched the play like you guys but my sense in real time was that Sudfeld was actually open that it was a combination of Brady missing him and Sudfeld not being much of an athlete able to adjust to the ball and go get it. If Gronk is running that route I think it might be a catch.
Brady was asked about that particular play (KT and JE being wide open, but he threw to Sudfeld). His response was basically that the play was NOT designed for the deep ball, that JE and KT were essentially decoys and TB never even looked for them assuming they would be covered based on his pre-snap read. He also added that he wished he had looked for them as both WRs let him know that they were "set free" in their patterns.
Here is a link to the audio, you can skip to 6:28 or so:
http://audio.weei.com/a/81193419/tom-brady-i-don-t-make-any-personnel-decisions.htm
Here is a link to the audio, you can skip to 6:28 or so:
http://audio.weei.com/a/81193419/tom-brady-i-don-t-make-any-personnel-decisions.htm
Cabin Mirror said:
Makes a lot of sense. Also somewhat discredits the notion that Brady looked deep as his first read on that play.
Mascho has forgotten more about football than I know, but I'm very skeptical that Brady's 1st read is usually the deep read. Not these Patriots. The intermediate route game has been so crucial to Brady over the years. You can see it in his body language how often he has chosen his receiver pre-snap based on defensive look/game situation and goes to him when the coverage looks as he expects. The same is true for his deep passes, they're just more infrequent. He's been such a smart situational QB over the years -- it just doesn't add up that he's wasting his time going to his low percentage reads first on every play before looking to Welker/Gronk/Hernandez in the slot/running an out/running up the seam.
That last sentence made me sad.
amarshal2 said:
Did you miss the their three Super Bowl champion seasons?
I really think the evolution of Brady into a superstar/HoFer/possibleGOAT has made people forget that he made his bones and his reputation on making great reads on short and intermediate passing, keeping the chains moving and managing the game. When Brady won his first ring, being called a "game manager" as he was so often referred to as was considered a back-handed compliment at best for a QB. Now it's the sine qua non of the position.
Somewhat off-topic, but I mostly disagree with you here. Who are the "game managers" who've won Super Bowls? The guys I think of - Schaub, Alex Smith, Dalton - have all seemed to get exposed in the playoffs / against good teams eventually. But we've seen guys like Eli and Brees, who throw relatively high number of interceptions, get on hot streaks and win playoff games / Super Bowls.Reverend said:
And I think those early Pats teams threw deep more than people remember. Unfortunately, no way to test statistically.
Dilfer, Mark Rypien, Brad Johnson are three guys I think of. All three had tremendous D's, similar to the Pats in their 3 wins.
To be clear, I was responding to Rev's notion that "When Brady won his first ring, being called a 'game manager' as he was so often referred to as was considered a back-handed compliment at best for a QB. Now it's the sine qua non of the position." Since Dilfer and Rypien were both before Brady and Johnson just a year after his first SB, I don't think they're evidence that now being a game manager is "the sine qua non of the position."Dogman2 said:
And seriously Rev, using French terms in the football forum? How pretentious can you get. Take it to the French subforum.
(yeah, I know it's Latin)
Brad Johnson was a much better QB than he gets credit for. If you look at his ratings over time vs Dilfer they were night and day apart. That's not to say that they both had elite Ds when they won... because you are right that they did. But Johnson was a B/B+ qb. Dilfer was a C/C-.
Super Nomario said:
Awesome. Latin and semantics in BBTL. The V&N transformation is progressing quite nicely.
Super Nomario said:
Brady was widely referred to as a "game manager" for a few years back then. So in answer to your "who" question, I respond "Brady."
I see it a bit like the decline of the term "system quarterback" as not being as useful as people used to think. That is to say, as football analysis has gotten more sophisticated (*hat tip* to you, by the way) people have come to realize that while some players are just absolute athletic freaks and can thrive anywhere, much of football is about finding guys who fit the system and adjusting systems to what you have. And that's not a knock--it's just what smart management does; linear concepts of quality simply don't apply.
OK, but you wrote that being a "game manager" was "the sine qua non" of the position, which Wikipedia tells me "refers to an indispensable and essential action, condition, or ingredient." I don't really see how Flacco or Eli or Roethlisberger or Rodgers or Brees match up with what I think of as a "game manager," which means we're working from a different definition of "game manager," or at least a different definition of "sine qua non."Reverend said:
Obviously Brady's not an "athletic freak" in the way, say, Calvin Johnson is, but I think he's much closer to the former - a scheme-transcendent talent - than a product of the system. All the offenses have been based on Erhardt-Perkins concepts, but Brady's responsibilities have fluctuated quite a bit depending on the quality and style of his backs, receivers, tight ends, and offensive line.Reverend said:
Super Nomario said:
Yeah, that may well have been too strong. I think there has been a huge shift in emphasis towards protecting the football vis-à-vis (you like that, punk?) and less celebration of the gun slinger approach.
Reverend said:
That was exactly my point. It's still true and is the reason I wrote my post.
amarshal2 said:
The offense of the last 2-3 years excelled at the intermediate* passing game. The fact that they had so many long plays** was much more a reflection of quality receivers making quality moves on the defense after catching the ball in a great position for YAC***. The only time Brady has really been a "deep ball thrower" (e.g. 30+ yards in the air -- which those passes to KT/JE would have been) is to Moss.
When I say that Brady excels in the intermediate passing game I don't mean that he's a game manager.
*When I say intermediate, I mean passes thrown 8-20 yards in the air. If this is wildly inconsistent with the common definition of "intermediate" then apologies for using the wrong terminology.)
**Going off of my memory here that they've had more long plays than most teams
***This is my unsubstantiated opinion/impression
I agree that Brady is excellent at the intermediate pass game. But I was also thinking about the times when they ran what was called a "dink and dunk" offense, although as stitch1 points out, that label might have held longer than reasonably appropriate.
Man, those two first play TDs to Branch against Pittsburgh after change of possession in that playoff game were gloroius.
Man, those two first play TDs to Branch against Pittsburgh after change of possession in that playoff game were gloroius.
I don't think you can use vis-à-vis reflexively like that.Reverend said:
You may be right that there's less praise for the gunslinger, though I think 80+% of that if Favre retiring. What's interesting to me is that we've seen guys like Eli and Flacco - more gunslinger types, I would say - win Super Bowls in recent years with crazy low-turnover playoff runs. It makes sense: statistically, it's easier for a gunslinger to have a lucky three-game run of not throwing picks (since INTs are fairly rare events anyway) than it is for a game manager to have a three-game run of making plays.
Damn, you got me--I wrote it too different ways; I meant to say vis-a-vis gunslinger.Super Nomario said:I don't think you can use vis-à-vis reflexively like that.
You may be right that there's less praise for the gunslinger, though I think 80+% of that if Favre retiring. What's interesting to me is that we've seen guys like Eli and Flacco - more gunslinger types, I would say - win Super Bowls in recent years with crazy low-turnover playoff runs. It makes sense: statistically, it's easier for a gunslinger to have a lucky three-game run of not throwing picks (since INTs are fairly rare events anyway) than it is for a game manager to have a three-game run of making plays.
I agree on the Favre though. And I think we may have stumbled into a new facet of the "built for the playoffs" debate that is probably under-explored. I think it would be really interesting to do a content analysis study of how quarterbacks were discussed over time. As I recall, as Brady continued to win, people started invoking Montana and questioning what "really" made for a winner, which is consistent with the broader trend of emphasizing not just innate athletic gifts but more holistic views of play. And I do believe that Brady was a huge part of that, although not because he's "special," but because of the timing with respect to sports going to a whole new level of big money, which means people upping their game with respect to understanding what makes a winner. But I'm way off topic--well, maybe not. This is about what makes a working passing game... So, yeah, I think Brady's success in the Weiss offense changed a lot of perceptions, even if the reality was already changing.
Before moving on to a review of Week 3 (which I should finally be able to get to today) I wanted to try and put a bow on the whole "first read" concept we've been discussing this week. To do this I'm going to divorce us from the play that got us on this topic, and discuss a play that we ran in college and is probably in 99 percent of college and pro offenses. Below is a still from last week's Baltimore-Houston game. The play, which is diagrammed in the still, is called Weak Pro Right Rocket X-585 Swing Out. This will hopefully illustrate the point that just because a read is a QB's first read, it doesn't mean the play is necessarily designed to go there.
This is a traditional "pro" set to the right, with the tight end flanked by the Z receiver. X is alone to the left. This is a "weak" formation because rather than a traditional "I," the FB is offset away from the TE, to the "weak" side of the formation. "Rocket" was the protection scheme - block right (as opposed to Lion). X-585 is the route tree, from right to left. X runs the first numbered route, a 5 route (which is a comeback 13 to 10 yards to the sideline). The TE runs an 8, or post route, and the Z runs another 5 route to the strong side of the formation. Swing-Out are the routes for the HB and the FB respectively (we called them A and B).
Houston is in a Cover 2 look, which is perfect for what I want to illustrate. The reason why this play is one of the first we put in each season is because it can equally attack Cover 1, Cover 2, Cover 3 and Man coverages. Depending on the coverage, we would run our progression on either the strong-side or the weak-side of the formation. If Houston stayed in Cover 2 at the snap, the reads were on the strong-side of the formation: A quick look to the post route, then to the Z on the 5, then to the HB on the checkdown. The concept behind this route against Cover 2 is that you are trying to "high-lo" the strong-side corner in the flat. You have the 5 route over top of him, and the checkdown in front of him. But you need something to hold that strong-side safety in place. If, for example, the TE were to run a simple curl route, he'd be swallowed up by the LBs, and the strong-side safety could rotate over to the Z, and the CB would swallow up the checkdown, and you're tucking and running. But here, the TE's post route is designed to hold that SS in place, freeing up room for the 5 route and that "high-lo" combination.
Now, the reason why you look at that post route first, even though the play isn't designed to go there, is two fold. First, you need to hold that SS and get him thinking that you might throw the post route. A post route from a TE or a slot receiver against Cover 2 is a nice route to throw, as deep middle is one of the soft spots in Cover 2. The SS knows that, so he doesn't want to pull off that route sooner than he has to. But if he's a smart DB, even though he's in zone he's reading the QB's eyes. If the QB is just staring at the Z from the snap, at some point the SS is going to start ignoring that post route, and then the 5 and the swing routes are going to both be covered. That first look to the TE works to hold that SS, freeing up the high-low combination.
Secondly, you take that quick look to the TE because again, deep middle is a weak spot in Cover 2. If you've been making hay all day with that 5 route to the Z, maybe the SS is getting frustrated hearing from his defensive coordinator about helping out on that route. Maybe he's trying to make a play and bails quickly on the post and tries to get underneath the comeback. What we were coached was to decide by our second right foot on the post route. This was a five step drop route for us, meaning three hard right feet, gather, and throw. Coaches wanted us to have determined by that second right foot (i.e., halfway through our drop) whether we could throw the post. If we couldn't, then we come off it for our third right foot, gather, and be ready to throw the comeback. If we can't throw that, quickly reset and hit the swing. So if by that second right foot you see the SS driving hard to the outside, you take your shot on that post route. Make sense?
I talked at the outset how this play is designed to attack different coverages easily. Consider this play against Cover 3. Against this formation, Cover 3 would have the CB to the Z's side of the formation covering short flat. The SS would cover deep outside to the strong side of the formation, the FS would cover deep middle, and the weak-side CB would cover deep outside to the weak side. Trying to throw this route to the strong side of the formation would be futile. The FS would swallow up that post route from the TE, the SS would hang on that comeback route by the Z, and the strong-side corner sits on that checkdown. Nothing would be open.
So you read that route weak-side, from the X's comeback route to your FB on the out.
The reason is that the weakside CB has no help over the top, so he has to respect the possibility that the X isn't running a comeback, but a go route. So he's playing deep leverage on X. If the X has any ability, he should be able to sell the go route and create separation driving back to the sideline. If your X doesn't have any ability to create separationhe's named mascho and the whole "sophomore year slash experiment is failing you have your FB running away from the LBs and hopefully winning that matchup.
So, to bring this back to my point, just because you look/read one route first, doesn't necessarily mean the play is designed to go there. It might be a cursory "look off" situation where you're trying to hold a DB long enough for the intended target to free up. In the play here, that comeback route to the Z against a Cover 2 look. In the case of the Patriots and this play we've been discussing, the cursory look deep which Brady makes towards Edelman/Thompkins is designed to hold those DBs long enough to allow Sudfeld to come open. IF Brady were to look at Sudfeld first, talented DBs will give up on those deep routes quicker.
Anyway, I hope that makes sense. I hope to get to some stuff from Week 3 before tonight's game.
This is a traditional "pro" set to the right, with the tight end flanked by the Z receiver. X is alone to the left. This is a "weak" formation because rather than a traditional "I," the FB is offset away from the TE, to the "weak" side of the formation. "Rocket" was the protection scheme - block right (as opposed to Lion). X-585 is the route tree, from right to left. X runs the first numbered route, a 5 route (which is a comeback 13 to 10 yards to the sideline). The TE runs an 8, or post route, and the Z runs another 5 route to the strong side of the formation. Swing-Out are the routes for the HB and the FB respectively (we called them A and B).
Houston is in a Cover 2 look, which is perfect for what I want to illustrate. The reason why this play is one of the first we put in each season is because it can equally attack Cover 1, Cover 2, Cover 3 and Man coverages. Depending on the coverage, we would run our progression on either the strong-side or the weak-side of the formation. If Houston stayed in Cover 2 at the snap, the reads were on the strong-side of the formation: A quick look to the post route, then to the Z on the 5, then to the HB on the checkdown. The concept behind this route against Cover 2 is that you are trying to "high-lo" the strong-side corner in the flat. You have the 5 route over top of him, and the checkdown in front of him. But you need something to hold that strong-side safety in place. If, for example, the TE were to run a simple curl route, he'd be swallowed up by the LBs, and the strong-side safety could rotate over to the Z, and the CB would swallow up the checkdown, and you're tucking and running. But here, the TE's post route is designed to hold that SS in place, freeing up room for the 5 route and that "high-lo" combination.
Now, the reason why you look at that post route first, even though the play isn't designed to go there, is two fold. First, you need to hold that SS and get him thinking that you might throw the post route. A post route from a TE or a slot receiver against Cover 2 is a nice route to throw, as deep middle is one of the soft spots in Cover 2. The SS knows that, so he doesn't want to pull off that route sooner than he has to. But if he's a smart DB, even though he's in zone he's reading the QB's eyes. If the QB is just staring at the Z from the snap, at some point the SS is going to start ignoring that post route, and then the 5 and the swing routes are going to both be covered. That first look to the TE works to hold that SS, freeing up the high-low combination.
Secondly, you take that quick look to the TE because again, deep middle is a weak spot in Cover 2. If you've been making hay all day with that 5 route to the Z, maybe the SS is getting frustrated hearing from his defensive coordinator about helping out on that route. Maybe he's trying to make a play and bails quickly on the post and tries to get underneath the comeback. What we were coached was to decide by our second right foot on the post route. This was a five step drop route for us, meaning three hard right feet, gather, and throw. Coaches wanted us to have determined by that second right foot (i.e., halfway through our drop) whether we could throw the post. If we couldn't, then we come off it for our third right foot, gather, and be ready to throw the comeback. If we can't throw that, quickly reset and hit the swing. So if by that second right foot you see the SS driving hard to the outside, you take your shot on that post route. Make sense?
I talked at the outset how this play is designed to attack different coverages easily. Consider this play against Cover 3. Against this formation, Cover 3 would have the CB to the Z's side of the formation covering short flat. The SS would cover deep outside to the strong side of the formation, the FS would cover deep middle, and the weak-side CB would cover deep outside to the weak side. Trying to throw this route to the strong side of the formation would be futile. The FS would swallow up that post route from the TE, the SS would hang on that comeback route by the Z, and the strong-side corner sits on that checkdown. Nothing would be open.
So you read that route weak-side, from the X's comeback route to your FB on the out.
The reason is that the weakside CB has no help over the top, so he has to respect the possibility that the X isn't running a comeback, but a go route. So he's playing deep leverage on X. If the X has any ability, he should be able to sell the go route and create separation driving back to the sideline. If your X doesn't have any ability to create separation
So, to bring this back to my point, just because you look/read one route first, doesn't necessarily mean the play is designed to go there. It might be a cursory "look off" situation where you're trying to hold a DB long enough for the intended target to free up. In the play here, that comeback route to the Z against a Cover 2 look. In the case of the Patriots and this play we've been discussing, the cursory look deep which Brady makes towards Edelman/Thompkins is designed to hold those DBs long enough to allow Sudfeld to come open. IF Brady were to look at Sudfeld first, talented DBs will give up on those deep routes quicker.
Anyway, I hope that makes sense. I hope to get to some stuff from Week 3 before tonight's game.
mascho said:
I just wanted to thank you for this outstanding analysis. I hope you don't get discouraged that it's not provoking pages and pages of discussions. I look forward to reading your analysis every week and find it very informative. I just don't have anything productive to add to the conversation.
Please keep it up!
Jer said:
Thanks. As is probably evident, I love talking about this stuff. I mean, some people doodle, I draw routes and coverages and plays. Most of my old school notebooks (and even some professional notebooks) are filled with ways to attack various coverages.
Mascho,
Another novice question....
How many routes can a Qb be expected to check?
Say a 2 WR/2TE/1RB formation. Would plays be provided with reads for all 5 potential targets? (assume the RBs and TEs are not being kept in for protection)
4wr Formation?
Is a "realistic expectation" 3 reads? 4? 6? 7 (Wr1, WR2,RB1,TE1,TE2, RB1 again, WR2 again etc etc)?
I guess my bigger question is (again back to the "infamous" Sudfield Throw....) is it realistic to expect Brady (or any QB) to check 4 or 5 targets? I know protection comes into play...but I am asking from a "as they draw it up" perspective. From that perspective the coaches must have an expectation of how long protection can hold ...thus how long they think they can give Brady to scan the routes. Obviously they would never have 10 reads....as they cant assume that Brady will have that long to scan (plus I assume a QB would either tuck it in that situation and run or throw it away. Plus eventually its a fire drill and the Recievers all run comebacks...)
Also (sorry if I missed it in an earlier explanation) how common is it planned for a Qb to read a receiver once......go to other receivers then comeback to the first guy (Say on a double move where the CB bites on the first move)? Would you ever have 3 reads on a receiver? 4?
Ok thats more the 1 novice question....
Another novice question....
How many routes can a Qb be expected to check?
Say a 2 WR/2TE/1RB formation. Would plays be provided with reads for all 5 potential targets? (assume the RBs and TEs are not being kept in for protection)
4wr Formation?
Is a "realistic expectation" 3 reads? 4? 6? 7 (Wr1, WR2,RB1,TE1,TE2, RB1 again, WR2 again etc etc)?
I guess my bigger question is (again back to the "infamous" Sudfield Throw....) is it realistic to expect Brady (or any QB) to check 4 or 5 targets? I know protection comes into play...but I am asking from a "as they draw it up" perspective. From that perspective the coaches must have an expectation of how long protection can hold ...thus how long they think they can give Brady to scan the routes. Obviously they would never have 10 reads....as they cant assume that Brady will have that long to scan (plus I assume a QB would either tuck it in that situation and run or throw it away. Plus eventually its a fire drill and the Recievers all run comebacks...)
Also (sorry if I missed it in an earlier explanation) how common is it planned for a Qb to read a receiver once......go to other receivers then comeback to the first guy (Say on a double move where the CB bites on the first move)? Would you ever have 3 reads on a receiver? 4?
Ok thats more the 1 novice question....
Is it also not being too fair to Brady to say he was on to a different read and so not his fault?
I mean..cripes, 2 guys were wide open in the same general direction he threw it...just 10-15 yards further downfield. Brady had all day and he threw to Sudfield before his break. It seems to me a fair expectation that HoF QB like Brady will have enough field awareness to take his time and at a minimum give his rookie TE a beat more to make his break and perhaps not be so fixed on him that he misses 2 guys open for TDs -- it's not like they were on the other side of the field.
I mean..cripes, 2 guys were wide open in the same general direction he threw it...just 10-15 yards further downfield. Brady had all day and he threw to Sudfield before his break. It seems to me a fair expectation that HoF QB like Brady will have enough field awareness to take his time and at a minimum give his rookie TE a beat more to make his break and perhaps not be so fixed on him that he misses 2 guys open for TDs -- it's not like they were on the other side of the field.
Fantastic stuff. Really, really lucid. You don't just love talking about it, you are good at explaining it; the notion of strategic reads here really comes across:
Question:
Why wouldn't there be weakside help over the top in a Cover-3? I thought Cover-3 meant three guys back splitting the field into thirds. Or is it that in a Cover-3, that weakside CB is himself the guy responsible for the deep portion of the field so he's caught between zone coverage responsibilities and wanting to stick close to the WR, and then the D is stuck counting on the LB coverage in the short/intermediate weak side, which should be inferior to what a CB would provide? Or something else altogether?
Question:
mascho said:
I talked at the outset how this play is designed to attack different coverages easily. Consider this play against Cover 3. Against this formation, Cover 3 would have the CB to the Z's side of the formation covering short flat. The SS would cover deep outside to the strong side of the formation, the FS would cover deep middle, and the weak-side CB would cover deep outside to the weak side. Trying to throw this route to the strong side of the formation would be futile. The FS would swallow up that post route from the TE, the SS would hang on that comeback route by the Z, and the strong-side corner sits on that checkdown. Nothing would be open.
So you read that route weak-side, from the X's comeback route to your FB on the out.
The reason is that the weakside CB has no help over the top, so he has to respect the possibility that the X isn't running a comeback, but a go route. So he's playing deep leverage on X. If the X has any ability, he should be able to sell the go route and create separation driving back to the sideline. If your X doesn't have any ability to create separationhe's named mascho and the whole "sophomore year slash experiment is failingyou have your FB running away from the LBs and hopefully winning that matchup.
Why wouldn't there be weakside help over the top in a Cover-3? I thought Cover-3 meant three guys back splitting the field into thirds. Or is it that in a Cover-3, that weakside CB is himself the guy responsible for the deep portion of the field so he's caught between zone coverage responsibilities and wanting to stick close to the WR, and then the D is stuck counting on the LB coverage in the short/intermediate weak side, which should be inferior to what a CB would provide? Or something else altogether?
Tony C said:
Maybe. But on the other hand, maybe what makes him a HoF QB is his ability to focus on his read progression and not get distracted hoping for big money. That probably takes a lot of discipline.
I mean, it sounds like a percentages game. If we focus on the one incident where there would have been a big win, then it looks dumb. But if over the course of 100s of plays, doing the read progression this way gets you more yards and more points, then that's how you play it. Kinda like judging the success of the shift in baseball on just the balls that go through without looking at the complete set of outcomes.