Guilty as charged. I was one of those people who thought it was a pretty easy decision to go for it given they hadn't been able to move the ball all day. The more I think about it, the more I see the value in taking the 3 points and hoping you get another crack at a game-winning TD. As we saw, scoring a TD guarantees nothing. The 2 pt play is at best a 50/50 shot. And I don't think you were wrong to discount that even further given how the Denver defense and New England offense had played up to that point.
Belichick's 4th and 1 decision
- Thread starter Bellhorn
- Start date
That was awesome, thank you!
One possible source that I thought of in the 4th down bot: IIRC, it's trained on data from 2000-2014.
The kickoff was moved back to the 35-yard line in 2011. Doesn't seem like much, but that's essentially enough to turn the old OT sudden death format into a coin toss.
Kickoffs at the 35 would tip the scales slightly in favor of kicking FGs/punting and hoping to get the ball back instead of going for it on marginal 4th downs, if the model hasn't already corrected for this.
The kickoff was moved back to the 35-yard line in 2011. Doesn't seem like much, but that's essentially enough to turn the old OT sudden death format into a coin toss.
Kickoffs at the 35 would tip the scales slightly in favor of kicking FGs/punting and hoping to get the ball back instead of going for it on marginal 4th downs, if the model hasn't already corrected for this.
BB should have realized that their 8 point deficit was truly a two score deficit. Under ordinary circumstances BB's decision on 4th and 1 was justifiable, but not on Sunday. The Patriots were unable to convert third downs the entire game, and there was no reason to believe they were going to convert a fourth down AND a two point conversion. At some point they needed to take easy points and the 6:00 minute spot was when to do it as the odds heavily favored the team getting the ball back at least once at that point.
I hated the decision to go for it at the time and it was disappointing to gain the hindsight that kicking could have made a big difference. Down 7, going for it would have been the best decision - there's merit in thinking you might not get there again, and if you don't convert the only appreciable difference in position is you are now almost surely playing for overtime whereas cutting the deficit to 2 or 0 with five minutes to go gives you a lot of time to win in regulation.
But down 8, the logic just doesn't add up to me. If we're comfortable foregoing the points to go for it because we're scared of how effective Denver's defense had been, why are we so comfortable accepting that we'd be putting the game on the line on a 1 chance play (the necessary 2pc attempt)? Joker's post right above me expresses this idea best, I think. Treating the 8 point deficit as a one score game had lose by 2 written all over it, and unfortunately that's exactly what happened.
But down 8, the logic just doesn't add up to me. If we're comfortable foregoing the points to go for it because we're scared of how effective Denver's defense had been, why are we so comfortable accepting that we'd be putting the game on the line on a 1 chance play (the necessary 2pc attempt)? Joker's post right above me expresses this idea best, I think. Treating the 8 point deficit as a one score game had lose by 2 written all over it, and unfortunately that's exactly what happened.
The problem is that the hindsight is wrong. There's no reason to believe that if the Patriots kick there, that the Broncos don't come out and run their real offense on the next drive, instead being super conservative.
The point of going for it early is that if you miss the 2 point conversion, you still have a chance to do something.
The play call was terrible.
Ignore the two point try for a moment and call it a two score game.
One of those scores must be a touchdown, and they had a better chance of scoring a touchdown facing 4th and 1 from the 16 than they had of driving all the way down the field again after a Denver punt.
The disparity between those two options is only magnified by the effectiveness of the Bronco defense, because going for it and driving for a FG requires the Patriots to make fewer plays than kicking on 4th and 1.
One of those scores must be a touchdown, and they had a better chance of scoring a touchdown facing 4th and 1 from the 16 than they had of driving all the way down the field again after a Denver punt.
The disparity between those two options is only magnified by the effectiveness of the Bronco defense, because going for it and driving for a FG requires the Patriots to make fewer plays than kicking on 4th and 1.
Haven't read every post but kick the field goal was better for me. At 20 - 20, there would have been a high probability of the game going into overtime, and the Pats were probably more gassed than the Broncos, so you minimize the chance of OT. You say maybe they'd be too gassed to come up with a TD drive after a FG and stopping Denver. Maybe, but 20 - 20 with short time left sounds like a furious last 2 - 3 minutes or so and then overtime. Go for the win on the road even though that involved a big gamble on getting a TD drive after a FG.
I think without perfect information, it's a coin toss. Even if you look at it as a likely two-score situation, going for it on 4th-and-one, then scoring a touchdown gives you two ways to win: 1) a two-point conversion to tie, then a field goal to win, or 2) if you miss the extra-2, a game-ending field goal to win.
In other words, down by eight, it doesn't make much difference if you score a TD then a FG or the other way around. I assume, that on the drive that ended with the 4th-and-one, BB thought the chances of scoring a TD right then were better than scoring a TD later.
Add to all that the likelihood that BB wanted to avoid OT (Pats players gassed, Brady beat up) then the go-for-it decision makes even more sense.
Tough to make a good play call when 40-80 percent of your offensive line whiff on their blocks on any given play.
This makes absolutely no sense. If you kick a FG, you also still have a chance to do something. Granted, the "something" required will be greater, but then again the probability of FG success at the decision point is also higher than the probability of scoring a TD on that drive. The question is how all of the various probabilities add up - intuition-based heuristics like this are completely useless.
But you can't ignore the two-point try. The possibility of tying the game on this drive adds win equity to the attempted 4th down conversion. The question is whether the equity from scenarios involving multiple scores (which tend to favor the immediate FG) are enough to offset this.
Edit: Also, even if it made sense to ignore the two-point try, you would still be incorrect that this argues in favor of the 4th down conversion attempt. You seem to be overlooking that this option also has a greater probability of leading to no points, and therefore requiring two subsequent scoring possessions.
What? No, it's exactly the opposite. The probability of OT was much higher following the 4th down attempt.
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As someone who didn't watch the game, can I ask - Was TJ Ward already out by this decision? Was his absence probably a factor in the missed Gronk coverages that created the Patriots 4th quarter drives?
I guess the point is - if he was out and BB thought he might be back, would it make sense to go for it, in that situation, with the defense a man down? Or, if Ward wasn't injured yet, did he think there was very little chance the Patriots could mount another drive?
Is this a factor at all? Maybe not.
I guess the point is - if he was out and BB thought he might be back, would it make sense to go for it, in that situation, with the defense a man down? Or, if Ward wasn't injured yet, did he think there was very little chance the Patriots could mount another drive?
Is this a factor at all? Maybe not.
You are right, but from what I can tell the "it's really hard to get into the red zone and score TDs, so don't pass up those chances" heuristic is a really strong contributor to the equation.
Suppose you're down *10* points, 4th-and-2 16 yards from goal, 6:00 left. Even though a failure to score here seems like certain doom, Burke's 4th down calculator still says go for it (assuming league-average everything). In fact, if you hold everything else constant and adjust only the yardage needed for the first down, Burke's model recommends going for it even if it's 4th-and-10. I'm not sure I'd go quite that far (there might well be smoothing errors in the model, etc.), but it does seem compelling.
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Obviously the two point try is relevant, but it seemed that some people were getting hung up on how difficult it might or not be. If you ignore it and still decide that going for it is the right call, taking it into account is only going to make that choice more obvious.
I am not overlooking that this option has a greater probability of leading to no points (than, presumably, kicking). I am arguing that it has a lesser probability of leading to no points than a post-field-goal-and-forced-punt drive where the offence is forced to score a touchdown or die trying. The situation where the Patriots kick three field goals is obviously possible (it could have happened Sunday), but the odds are so low it barely factors in.
Apparently Bill has been reading this thread:
http://espn.go.com/blog/new-england-patriots/post/_/id/4790288/bill-belichick-elaborates-on-fourth-down-calls-that-didnt-pan-out
http://espn.go.com/blog/new-england-patriots/post/_/id/4790288/bill-belichick-elaborates-on-fourth-down-calls-that-didnt-pan-out
Belichick is so good at what he does.
Wow. Even though I don't like aspects of the NFL, it's worth following the Patriots even just as an example of great management and execution and how that leads to excellence.
What did you guys make of this, from the ESPN article:
Too banged up to go up-tempo? The line couldn't handle it (a possibility for sure)? Brady couldn't do it for some reason? The altitude? Perhaps inability to practice up-tempo last handful of weeks given all the injuries?
I did think not trying to go up tempo was interesting; there were limited chances, but it clearly wasn't in the plan, and Belichick seems to suggest there was a reason (though he doesn't share what it was)
We know that Brady's right ankle was heavily taped, Gronk was dealing with knee issues and cramps from the altitude, and Edelman's foot wasn't 100 percent. Add the line woes to that, and going up tempo might not have been possible
Bedard on F&M had an interesting take on this play that Harris screwed up and likely luckily ended up killing the play.
He said that in those situations Denver always played MtM and that play, with Edelman coming in motion across the formation was a MtM killer.
The entire Denver defense played MtM but Harris didn't, stayed home and blew up the play.
If Harris did what he was "supposed " to do Edelman would have likely scored a Touchdown on that play.
He did leave open that maybe Harris sniffed it out and made an amazing play but he was leaning towards a screw up.
Just an interesting take that I hadn't seen brought up.
He said that in those situations Denver always played MtM and that play, with Edelman coming in motion across the formation was a MtM killer.
The entire Denver defense played MtM but Harris didn't, stayed home and blew up the play.
If Harris did what he was "supposed " to do Edelman would have likely scored a Touchdown on that play.
He did leave open that maybe Harris sniffed it out and made an amazing play but he was leaning towards a screw up.
Just an interesting take that I hadn't seen brought up.
Interesting. One of the reasons KC gave for not going no-huddle in the divisional game was that their OL was banged up and they were unsure if the blocking assignments would be picked up if they sped up the pace. Perhaps given the injuries on the line the Pats felt the same way.